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ABSTRACT
Ibrahim M. Waziri, Jr. Ph.D., Purdue University, August 2016. Packet Filter Performance Monitor (Anti-DDoS Algorithm for Hybrid Topologies). Major Professors:
Victor Raskin & Julia Taylor.
DDoS attacks are increasingly becoming a major problem. According to Arbor
Networks, the largest DDoS attack reported by a respondent in 2015 was 500 Gbps.
Hacker News stated that the largest DDoS attack as of March 2016 was over 600
Gbps, and the attack targeted the entire BBC website.
With this increasing frequency and threat, and the average DDoS attack duration
at about 16 hours, we know for certain that DDoS attacks will not be going away anytime soon. Commercial companies are not eﬀectively providing mitigation techniques
against these attacks, considering that major corporations face the same challenges.
Current security appliances are not strong enough to handle the overwhelming traﬃc
that accompanies current DDoS attacks. There is also a limited research on solutions
to mitigate DDoS attacks. Therefore, there is a need for a means of mitigating DDoS
attacks in order to minimize downtime. One possible solution is for organizations to
implement their own architectures that are meant to mitigate DDoS attacks.
In this dissertation, we presented and implemented an architecture that utilizes
an activity monitor to change the states of ﬁrewalls based on their performance in
a hybrid network1 . Both ﬁrewalls are connected inline. The monitor is mirrored to
monitor the ﬁrewall states. The monitor reroutes traﬃc when one of the ﬁrewalls
becomes overwhelmed due to a HTTP DDoS ﬂooding attack. The monitor connects
to the API of both ﬁrewalls. The communication between the ﬁrewalls and monitor
is encrypted using AES, based on PyCrypto python implementation.
1

A hybrid network is a network comprised of both hardware and virtual firewalls

xii
This dissertation is structured in three parts. The ﬁrst part found the weakness
of the hardware ﬁrewall and determined its threshold based on spike and endurance
tests2 . This was achieved by ﬂooding the hardware ﬁrewall with HTTP packets until
the ﬁrewall became overwhelmed and unresponsive. The second part implements the
same test as the ﬁrst, but targeted towards the virtual ﬁrewall. The same parameters,
test factors, and determinants were used; however a diﬀerent load tester was utilized.
The ﬁnal part was the implementation and design of the ﬁrewall performance monitor.
The main goal of the dissertation is to minimize downtime when network ﬁrewalls
are overwhelmed as a result of a DDoS attack.

2

Memory & CPU Utilization were used as determinants

1

1. INTRODUCTION
Individuals and organizations store data either in their individual computers or organization servers. Networking allow users to share data with just a click. The internet
has revolutionized the communication world; it is a medium for data dissemination
and a means for collaboration and interaction between individuals via their computers, irrespective of geographical location. To ensure connectivity and ease of access
to information, two ways of storing information are in place: 1) using a physically accessible storage device or; 2) using a cloud service that connects remotely by using
the network.
One feature of networking is its capability to give access to the users connected
to that network. Without security measures in place, there would be no control
over access to information on a network. Now that the internet connects every electronic device to a single global network, ensuring data security has become a tremendous challenge. Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), Advanced Persistent Threats
(APTs), and other forms of attack are continuously increasing, according to Fortune
Magazine (Gandel, 2015) Cyber attacks cost companies $400 billion annually. Another report from CNN Money estimates that the average US ﬁrm spends at least $15
million a year on cyber crime (Griﬃths, 2015). Current protection mechanisms are
inadequate to address the evolving cyber threats (Griﬃths, 2015). Advancements in
our defense mechanisms cannot manage the current rate at which new cyber threats
arise (Griﬃths, 2015).
Diﬀerent appliances and defense methods are used to protect and ensure data
security within a network. However, as technology advances, so does the mechanisms
used to protect that particular technology. In networking and cloud computing we
incorporate traditional and virtual systems, which results in a hybrid network topology (Buyya, Broberg, & Goscinski, 2010). For corporations and individuals to better

2
secure data and information in a network, they need to implement diﬀerent security
measures. One of the most integral aspect of network security implementation is the
deployment of a ﬁrewall (S. Ioannidis, Keromytis, Bellovin, & Smith, 2000).
Given the traditional and virtual network environments utilized by organizations,
the need arises for ﬁrewalls that protect both traditional and virtual environments.
It is a common practice to have a hardware ﬁrewall dedicated to the traditional network, and a virtual ﬁrewall dedicated to the virtual network. The problem with
this implementation is the fact that diﬀerent types of attacks can be implemented
within diﬀerent network environments. If an attack is targeted towards a traditional
network, the virtual network gets aﬀected, and vice-versa. For example, if a DDoS
attack targeted towards a dedicated traditional network ﬁrewall (hardware) is successful, the ﬁrewall becomes non-responsive, therefore making the virtual network
non-responsive.

1.1

Motivation
In this section, we discuss why both hardware and virtual ﬁrewalls fail under

DDoS attacks in hybrid architectures. This is the reason that motivates us to build
a performance monitor that monitors the state of the ﬁrewalls.

1.1.1

Challenges with Traditional Packet Filter Architectures

Traditional (Hardware) ﬁrewall appliances are closed boxes that connect to the external network on one interface(s), and the internal network on the other interface(s).
Hardware ﬁrewalls have minimal operating systems, which makes them fast in terms
of processing capabilities. Optimal performance of hardware ﬁrewalls is dependent
upon the ﬁrewall’s resources, which include the CPU and Memory availability (Kenney, 1996; Zalenski, 2002). Because of these factors, for a hardware ﬁrewall to function
as expected, it is required to have enough resources to process instructions (Panko,
2010).
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Denial of service attacks clogs up available resources (CPU, Memory, etc.) on a
target system, thereby overwhelming the system. Overwhelming a system causes it
to crash, reboot, or generally refuse any assistance to legitimate clients. DoS attack
are exceptionally basic; surely, pretty much every server will undoubtedly experience
such an attack sooner or later (Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004). In a situation where
the attack is facilitated crosswise over numerous hijacked systems (zombies) by an
attacker (master), the attack is referred to as DDoS (Carl, Kesidis, Brooks, & Rai,
2006; Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004). DDoS threats come in many varieties, some
of which target the underlying server infrastructure. Others exploit vulnerabilities
in applications and communication protocols. Unlike other kinds of cyber attacks
which are typically launched to establish a long-term foothold and hijack sensitive
information, denial of service assaults do not attempt to breach the security perimeter.
Rather, they attempt to make services, websites, and servers unavailable to legitimate
users. In some cases, however, DoS is also used as a smokescreen for other malicious
activities, and to dismantle security appliances (e.g., web application ﬁrewalls).
A successful DDoS attack is a highly noticeable event that impacts the entire
online user base (Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004). This makes a DDoS attack a popular weapon of choice for hacktivists, cyber vandals, extortionists, and anyone else
looking to make a point or champion a cause (Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004). DoS
assaults often last for days, weeks, or even months at a time, which makes them extremely destructive to any network. DDoS can cause loss of revenues, erode consumer
trust, force businesses to spend fortunes in compensations, and cause users to suﬀer
long-term reputation damage (Kenney, 1996; Mirkovic & Reiher, 2004; Thomas &
Stoddard, 2011).
Since the optimal operation of hardware ﬁrewalls is dependent on the ﬁrewall’s
available resources (Kenney, 1996). And DDoS are known to target and exhaust
resources. This makes hardware ﬁrewalls, among other devices, an attack target
(Byers, Rubin, & Kormann, 2004).
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1.1.2

Challenges with Virtual Packet Filter Architectures

Network function virtualization (NFV) is a strategy to virtualize the network
functions carried out by proprietary dedicated hardware. NFV decreases the quantity
of proprietary hardware required to execute and run network services1 . NFV allows
network operators to integrate middle-boxes in virtual machines (VM) and put those
VMs at subjective areas in the network (Anwer, Benson, Feamster, & Levin, 2015;
ESTI, n.d.).
Network Function Virtualization (NFV) has drawn noteworthy consideration from
both industry and the scholarly world with a vital movement within telecommunication service sector. By decoupling network functions (NFs) from the physical devices
from which they run, NFV can possibly result in signiﬁcant reduction in operating
costs (OPEX) and capital costs (CAPEX), and to encourage the deployment of new
services with expanded agility and faster time-to-value (Mijumbi et al., 2015). NFV is
still in its earliest stages and there is a chance and opportunity for research groups to
create new models, frameworks, and applications, and to assess choices and trade-oﬀs
in creating advance technologies for its optimized deployment.
NFV’s have their own security issues, which include hyperthreats and hypercalls,
as explained in (Shropshire, 2015). However, in this dissertation, we only focus on
security issues that arise from DDoS attacks. Considering that middle-boxes are
hardware appliances, they are expensive, hard to oversee, and their usefulness is hard
or diﬃcult to change. NFV has alleviated all these problems, with its ﬂexibility (Martins et al., 2014). Because virtualized network functions are deployed on dedicated
servers, which are hardware appliances, there is a need to secure the server appliances
used to virtualize NFs. One tool that is being used to secure such server appliance
perimeters is a hardware ﬁrewall.
1

TechTarget - NFV defined
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1.1.3

Challenges with Hybrid Packet Filters Architectures

A hybrid packet ﬁlter topology is required for a particular network architecture.
Traditional (hardware) ﬁrewall secures the NFV server’s perimeter, and the virtualized ﬁrewall secures other virtualized network functions. One packet ﬁlter inherits
the problem of another packet ﬁlter (Buyya et al., 2010; Cheswick, Bellovin, & Rubin,
2003; Cisco, 2014).
Attacks that exhaust resources (such as DDoS) which are targeted towards the
hardware ﬁrewalls used to secure the virtualized network functions server results in
network downtime, and inaccessibility of anything connected inline beyond the ﬁrewall
(Kenney, 1996; Martins et al., 2014). If the hardware ﬁrewall is down, the server that
NFs runs on automatically becomes unavailable, and hence the unavailability of data
and network downtime.

1.2

Problem Statement
This dissertation aims to enhance packet ﬁlter performance in hybrid networks

and to minimize network downtime caused by DDoS attacks in hybrid packet ﬁlter
topologies. This is achieved by monitoring the CPU and memory utilization of different ﬁrewalls. To ensure that, we claim the following: it is possible to implement an
architecture that mitigates DDoS attacks, minimizes network downtime, and transfers
packet ﬁltering service between ﬁrewalls in a hybrid network topology. We formulate
and validate the following hypotheses.
• It is possible to mitigate DDoS attacks on packet ﬁlters without dropping legitimate packets.
• It is possible to migrate packet ﬁltering services interchangeably between ﬁrewalls in a hybrid packet ﬁltering network when one ﬁrewall becomes overwhelmed.
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• It is possible to develop a monitoring tool that monitors the CPU and Memory
states of ﬁrewalls and minimizes network downtime during a DDoS attack on a
network.

1.3

Contribution and Overview
The main contribution of this dissertation is to avoid network downtime as a result

of ﬁrewall failures during a DDoS attack in a hybrid network. To ensure that, we
implement a number of tests on the Traditional, Virtual, and Hybrid architectures
and also develop an algorithm used to validate the hypothesis mentioned above. We
provide here a brief overview of tests and algorithms:
1. Spike Performance Test
To ﬁnd the threshold of the ﬁrewalls (both hardware and virtual), we carried
out a spike test that veriﬁes the ﬁrewall’s stability amid a burst of simultaneous
concurrent or network connections to changing time periods and degrees of trafﬁc load. This happens as a result of an attack that overwhelms the device (such
as a DDoS attack). We implemented a HTTP ﬂooding attack and monitored
CPU Utilization during this test.
2. Endurance Performance Test
Similar to the spike performance test, we carried out an endurance test. This
was implemented to discover whether the ﬁrewalls can withstand the necessary
processing loads for a long period of time. During the endurance test, we
implemented a HTTP ﬂooding attack, and monitored the memory utilization
of the ﬁrewalls.
3. Performance Monitoring/Packet Filtering Transfer Algorithm
In light of the outcomes of our tests, we developed an algorithm that monitors the states of the ﬁrewalls based on performance. The algorithm invokes
instructions when a newly deﬁned threshold is reached. The algorithm also
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transfers packet ﬁltering services between the ﬁrewalls when one of the ﬁrewalls
is overwhelmed. This results in more network up-time in the event of an attack, and also ensures that the ﬁrewall does not become non-responsive when
overwhelmed.

1.4

Dissertation Road-map
This work introduces a new security architectural monitor used in hybrid networks.

The monitor works by transferring packet ﬁltering services from one ﬁrewall to the
other when the network is under DDoS attack. The communication between the
monitor and the ﬁrewalls occurs through the ﬁrewall’s API. AES encryption algorithm
is used to ensure that all communication is secured.
In chapter 2, we review literature and research focused on network architectural
security, NFV’s, cyber threats (including DDoS attacks), and proposals for how DDoS
attacks can be mitigated. We then examined commercial DDoS mitigation solutions
that prevent and respond to ﬂooding attacks. We ﬁnished the chapter by discussing
the disadvantages of using commercial DDoS mitigation providers, and how they do
not provide a substantive solution to DDoS attacks.
Chapter 3 discusses the traditional packet ﬁlter architecture. The chapter begins
with an introduction to ﬁrewalls, and discusses how hardware ﬁrewalls diﬀer from
virtual ﬁrewalls. We then explained the problem statement and how we set up the
traditional architecture. We concluded the chapter by presenting the results of our
test.
Chapter 4 discusses the virtual packet ﬁlter architecture. We started by explaining
NFVs and current issues with virtualization. We highlight the problem statement and
explained our test parameters and results for the virtual architecture.
In chapter 5, we presented the packet ﬁltering monitor/algorithm. We explained
the monitor’s design, how the monitor works, and evaluate the monitor’s performance.
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We concluded by summarizing our ﬁndings and proposing areas of future study in
Chapter 6.

1.5

Dissertation Limitations
To the best of our knowledge, no existing research explains how monitoring ﬁrewall

performance is used to mitigate DDoS attacks. This study focused only on Layer 7 application level DDoS attacks, primarily based on HTTP traﬃc. HTTP traﬃc is the
protocol utilized for communication between a client and a web server (Cisco, 2014;
Dieter, 1999). All tests were conducted in a controlled, monitored environment. The
virtualized ﬁrewall and the web server run on a dedicated server with conﬁgurations
that are explained in later chapters. This work focus on internal threats, with the
assumption that an intruder has gained access to the network. The process of gaining
access to networks is beyond the scope of this study. The network is conﬁgured
in IPv4 instead of IPv6 because IPv4 is the most generally utilized version of the
Internet Protocol (Bade & Vanduhe, n.d.) and IPv6 features (e.g. larger address
space, optimized DHCP, IPSec, optimized mobility feature (Bade & Vanduhe, n.d.))
are beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The test focuses on mitigating the application layer DDoS attacks, which are
volumetric HTTP ﬂoods generated using diﬀerent load and stress testing tools. The
HTTP ﬂoods targets ﬁrewalls not other network devices. This study is not limited to
speciﬁc vendors. The choice of devices used are solely based on availability, and the
same process can be applied to any other vendor devices. This dissertation focuses
on accessing a web server in which traﬃc must pass through two checkpoints (the
ﬁrewalls) before reaching its destination.
Lastly, this dissertation does not attempt to provide a guide for malicious activity.
We presented the report in an ethical manner, such that a reader cannot gain knowledge of how to implement DDoS attacks. However, if this dissertation provides any
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hint that an adversary decides to implement or exploit, it is the sole responsibility of
the adversary and neither that of the author nor committee members.

10

2. RELATED WORK
2.1

Introduction
As of July 2015, the internet has connected an estimated of 1.03 billion hosts

worldwide (ISC, 2015). The internet is an assembly of diﬀerent networks accessible by
dissimilar users in diﬀerent ways. That means that users can access information using
the internet regardless of national and geographical boundaries. This convenience and
ease of accessibility to information, however, comes with security issues. These issues
include, theft and tampering information. These issues make all information online
vulnerable to unauthorized access and usage.
One of the most important aspects of technology is whether it favors oﬀense or
defense (R. Anderson, 2001). The diﬃculties of developing secure systems using a
penetrate-and-patch methodology have been familiar to the security community since
the Anderson report in the early 1970’s (J. P. Anderson, 1972).
Within recent years we have seen an expansion in the widespread adoption of commercial security technologies by governmental, military and commercial organizations,
due to their convenience, and ease of use. With increasing reliance on third-party security resources, also comes an increasing vulnerability to information meant to be
protected (J. M. Anderson, 2003; Venter & Eloﬀ, 2003). Although security threats
can range from psychological operations (social engineering) to physical attacks on
computers, one aspect of Information Security that most concerns computer users is
defending information against disruption or disabling the computerized functions and
resources that support an organization’s operations (Jajodia, Ammann, & McCollum,
1999).
Many of the threats to Information Security share common characteristics (Peltier,
2005). We are going to discuss some of the threats known today, but it is worthwhile
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mentioning that these threats do not represent a complete list of Information security
threats; considering new forms of attacks are discovered everyday. As it relates to
this dissertation; Information Security threats can be categorized as follows: External
and Internal.
• External Threats - This is the hacker threat, whether it is a single person, or
a nation state. This type of threat comes from external sources, someone not
connected to the network implements the attack. This types of attack includes
DDoS attack (Spears, 2006).
• Internal Threats - This is a type of threat that happens inside the network.
Internal threats do not only apply to malicious actives. User error and ignorance
play a large role in trusted individuals putting networks and systems at risk to
outside agents. Firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and other boundary
defense mechanisms are ineﬀective when circumvented by insiders.

2.2

Firewall Architectural/Implementation Security
Everyday new research is being conducted within the security ﬁeld. Network se-

curity is among the top research theme in information technology. Z. Yang, Qiao,
Liu, Yang, and Wan (2010) focused on a collaborative trust model of ﬁrewall-through
based on cloud computing. In this research, existing trust models and ﬁrewall innovation were studied. The researchers implemented a methodology using cloud computing that assess dynamic setting and presents the meaning of risk sign in ﬁrewalls.
The model has three advantages: there are distinctive security strategies for various domains, the model considers the exchange setting, the veriﬁable information of
entity dynamically impacts the estimation of trust worth. Finally, the trust model
is synchronous with the ﬁrewall and does not break the ﬁrewall’s local control policies. To conﬁrm the dependability and accuracy of the proposed trust model, a test
is done. The test result demonstrates that the trust model is robust and surpasses
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ordinary trust models in diﬀerent areas, because it eﬀectively control unauthorized
access within cloud computing environment.
Moyer and Schultz (1996) presents an orderly approach for ﬁrewall penetration
testing that advances the perspective that ﬁrewall testing ought to look at not just
the capability of a ﬁrewall to stop attack from outside threats, but also the resistance
of the whole system that the ﬁrewall ensure against external threats. As a result,
therefore, testing should take an orderly approach to guarantee that it is complete,
and to decrease the risk of threats and/or interference to the system and its hosts.
This study introduced a requirement for an eﬃcient approach to guide ﬁrewall testing.
Network ﬁrewalls, routers and switches utilize a rule database to choose which
packet will be permitted into and out of a network. By ﬁltering packets, the ﬁrewall, routers and switches can enhance security and execution. Be that as it may,
as the extent of the rule list builds, it gets hard to keep up and validate the rules
(Hazelhurst, Attar, & Sinnappan, 2000). Hazelhurst (2000) studied an algorithm for
analyzing ﬁrewall and router access lists. The algorithm is another representation of
rule list, and also a presentation of how Boolean expression can be utilized to analyze
rule sets. Eronen and Zitting (2001) presented an expert system for analyzing ﬁrewall
rules that looks into the problem of analyzing ﬁrewall conﬁgurations, using a tool that
comprehends Cisco access lists, it is actualized utilizing Eclipse, (a constraint logic
programming language). The study utilizes logic statements to express information
about networking, ﬁrewalls, and basic conﬁguration mistakes. Conﬁguring network
devices (especially from diﬀerent vendors) to work in unison can be diﬃcult. Notwithstanding reverse-engineering or ﬁguring out of existing setup is hard. To overcome
some of these diﬃculties, Mayer, Wool, and Ziskind (2000) studied a ﬁrewall analysis
algorithm that composed and actualized a novel ﬁrewall analysis tool. The tool permits the administrator to eﬀectively ﬁnd and test the global ﬁrewall policy (either an
implemented policy or an arranged one). The tool utilizes an insigniﬁcant depiction of
the network topology, and speciﬁcally parses the diﬀerent vendor-particular low-level
conﬁguration list. It interfaces with the client through a query-and-answer session,
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which is done at a higher point of abstraction. A common question the apparatus
can answer is “from which machines can our DMZ be accessed, and with which implementations?” The tool compliments existing vulnerability examination tools, as it
can be utilized before a policy is implemented. It works on a more justiﬁable level of
abstraction, and it manages all ﬁrewalls simultaneously (Mayer et al., 2000).
Firewalls and routers must perform packet classiﬁcations at high speeds to productively execute their capacities, for example, ﬁrewalls and diﬀserv. Arrangement can
be found on a self-assertive number of ﬁelds in the packet header. Rapidly classifying
an arbitrary number of ﬁelds is known to be hard, and has a poor scenario complexity.
Qiu, Varghese, and Suri (2001) analyzes two fundamental approaches; backtracking
search and set pruning attempts. The researchers propose several new techniques to
assist and enhance the two fundamental approaches, including: backtracking search
using small memory utilization, a novel compression algorithm, pipe-lining the inquiry, and trading-oﬀ easily amongst backtracking and set pruning. The research
quantiﬁes the performance gains for every approach utilizing actual databases. The
study demonstrates that on actual ﬁrewall databases, the schemes with the advancements are ideal in time and capacity.
Guillen, Sossa, and Estupiñán (2012) demonstrates how performance results between closed and open source routing approaches are vital parameters for network
architects. The study breaks down execution in convergence time, throughput and delay between routing approaches in view of virtual software router (VSR) and routing
approaches in view of proprietary hardware routers (PHR). The outcome demonstrates that VSR have better convergence times compared to hardware routers and
the throughput performance is better on PHR. Waziri Jr, Mirzoev, and Shropshire
(2014) looked into the comparison of control and hardware based ﬁltering architectures in order to identify the most eﬀective architecture, a control test with no ﬁrewall
was conducted, followed by a hardware based packet ﬁltering architecture. The study
used HTTP packets generated by a load testing tool. The results focused mainly on
endurance and the spike tests for the two architectures.
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Sheth and Thakker (2011) did a comparative research that evaluates diﬀerent
types of ﬁrewall operation, the operational conditions and performance results of
shortcomings in ﬁrewall operations. Moreover, the study analyzes reported issues
with existing ﬁrewalls. Detailed analysis and correlation is done in terms of cost,
security, operational ease, and execution of open source packet ﬁlter (PF) ﬁrewall,
checkpoint SPLAT, and Cisco ASA in a testing environment with laboratory generated monitored and controlled traﬃc. Diﬀerent throughputs and connection statistics
were utilized as benchmark for performance comparison. The outcomes showed that
Cisco ASA outperforms other ﬁrewalls in terms of performance. Checkpoint SPLAT
and OpenBSD PF likewise gives sensibly competitive performances.
Conventional ﬁrewalls depend on topology restrictions and controlled network to
implement traﬃc ﬁltering. Firewalls can’t ﬁlter unidentiﬁed packets, so all clients on
the internal side are trusted. While this model has functioned admirably for little to
medium size networks, networking advancements, for example, expanded availability,
higher line speeds, extranets, and working from home undermine and make access
control out of date. To address the issue of traditional ﬁrewalls, the idea of distributed
ﬁrewalls has been proposed. In this plan, security policy is still centrally deﬁned,
however implementation is left to the individual endpoints. IPSec might be utilized
to convey credentials that express parts of the overall network policy. On the other
hand, the credentials might be obtained through out-of-band means. S. Ioannidis et
al. (2000) presents the implementation and design of a distributed ﬁrewall based on
KeyNote trust management system and OpenBSD1 to specify, distribute and resolve
policy.
Firewalls are important tools for securing private networks. Be that as it may, by
just deploying ﬁrewalls, administrators are a long way from securing their networks.
Bad conﬁgurations results in breaches and network vulnerabilities. Speciﬁcally, conﬂicting ﬁltering rules leads to blocking legitimate traﬃc or allowing undesirable packets. Abbes, Bouhoula, and Rusinowitch (2008) shows another characterization strat1
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egy to recognize conﬂicting access rules inside a ﬁrewall. The technique forms an
arrangement of ﬁltering rules that have a variable number of ﬁelds. A ﬁeld has a
scope of values, represented by an internal or variable length bit string that may
cross with relating ﬁeld scope of diﬀerent rules. Keeping in mind the end goal is to
recognize overlaps, the study sorted out the states of each ﬁltering rule in a manner
that can rapidly isolate colliding rules.
Lihua, Jianning, and Zhendong (2006) presents a static analysis tool for ﬁrewall
modeling and analysis by regarding ﬁrewall conﬁgurations as important programs.
The tool applies static analysis methods to check misconﬁguration, for example, violation of policies, irregularities, and ineﬃciencies in individual ﬁrewalls and among
distributed ﬁrewalls. Firewalls performs typical model checking of the ﬁrewall designs
for all conceivable IP packets along every single conceivable data paths. Typical model
checking is both sound and complete due to the limited way of ﬁrewall conﬁgurations.
The tool is actualized by modeling ﬁrewall rules utilizing binary decision diagrams
which have been utilized eﬀectively as part of the hardware veriﬁcation and model
checking. The tool is utilized to reveal several real misconﬁguration in networks, some
of which have been conﬁrmed and amended by network administrators.
Chomsiri and Pornavalai (2006) proposes a strategy to analyze the ﬁrewall rule-set
or policy using relational algebra and a raining 2D-Box model. Rules analysis can
ﬁnd every one of the abnormalities in the ﬁrewall rule-set in the way that is typically utilized by numerous ﬁrewall devices, like, Cisco Access Control List, Iptables,
IPchains, or Check Point Firewall-1. While the current analyzing strategies consider
the peculiarities between any two rules in the ﬁrewall rule-set, researchers consider
more than two rules together in the meantime to ﬁnd the abnormality. In this way,
it is conceivable to ﬁnd the hidden anomalies in the ﬁrewall rule-set. Analysis results can be utilized with the proposed rules-combination technique displayed in the
research to minimize the ﬁrewall rule without changing the policy. At the end, the
research developed an application based on the proposed analyzing strategy. The
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application could help administrators examine and adjust a complex ﬁrewall policy
with fewer mistakes.
Until recently, the causes of decreased eﬀectiveness and restricted usage of new
security frameworks have been the inadequate execution of hardware that executes
access control, diﬃcult analysis, and a conﬁguration that conforms to corporate security policy requirements. Without the utilization of speciﬁc solutions that permit
eﬀective functioning of data security systems and their coordination with other network applications, a secured corporate network infrastructure is impossible to achieve.
Zaborovsky and Titov (2009) issue is considered from three points of view: the decision of the distributed hardware platform to enhance ﬁrewall performance; the portrayal of security approach by method for an organization-based access control mode;
and automating the process of ﬁrewall rules formation taking into account high-level
depiction of access policy requirements.
Kayssi, Harik, Ferzli, and Fawaz (2000) presents a ﬁrewall plan for IP networks
utilizing a ﬁeld-programmable gate array (FPGA). The FPGA actualizes, accepts, or
denies rules of the ﬁrewall. A hardware-based ﬁrewall oﬀers the beneﬁt of speed rate
over a software ﬁrewall, notwithstanding direct interfacing with network devices, for
example, an Ethernet. The research indicates how the rules are translated to VHDL
and then implemented in hardware, and how the hardware is used to ﬁlter network
traﬃc in a packet-by-packet method, or based on connecting information, with speeds
of more than 500,000 packets per second (Kayssi et al., 2000).
Golnabi, Min, Khan, and Al-Shaer (2006) shows an arrangement of techniques
and algorithms to examine and oversee ﬁrewall policy rules: (1) data mining techniques to deduce eﬀective ﬁrewall policy rules by mining the traﬃc log based on its
frequency; (2) ﬁltering-rule speculation to decrease the quantity of approach rules
by generalization: and (3) a procedure to recognize any obsolete rule and a set of
couple predominant rules, to create another arrangement of eﬃcient ﬁrewall policy
rules. Anomaly detection based on mining uncovered numerous hidden abnormalities
by analyzing the ﬁrewall policy rules, bringing about two new sorts of anomalies. As
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a result of these systems, network security administrators can consequently review
and update the rules.
From every one of these studies, we understand how a ﬁrewall is the eﬀective
innovation of today’s network security defense; we also understood how maintaining
ﬁrewall rules is complex, error-prone, expensive and ineﬀective for large networks.
These ﬁrewall rules are generally custom-designed and handwritten; as a result, they
are in consistent need of tuning and approval, because of the dynamic way of network
traﬃc, constant changing network environment, and its market demands.

2.3

Network Security/Function Virtualization
Networks are deployed to make computers more accessible to the outside world.

Making computers more accessible to the outside world is a mixed blessing (Dieter,
1999). More interactions are possible, but so are unwelcome interactions. One may
therefore wish to control how users are able to connect to a network system, how
users on the network access data, and how data is protected when it travels through
the network.
Networks are the communication infrastructure of data transmission between
nodes in a distributed system. Data meant to be sent by an application in one node
has to be prepared for transport, transmitted as a sequence of electronic or optical
signals, reassembled, and presented to an application program at the receiver’s end.
Network protocols have to ﬁnd a route from sender to receiver; they have to deal
with the loss or corruption of data, and also with the loss of connection. It is a good
practice to address these concerns one at a time with a layered architecture, application protocols at the top, and protocols that physically transmit bits of information
to the bottom.
Network management protocols provide the necessary support so that the data
generated by other protocols are eﬃciently delivered to the intended recipients. Management protocols, for example, may check the availability of intermediate nodes
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between sender and receiver, ﬁnd optimal connections, or resolve logical network addresses to physical addresses. Other protocols are used to remotely conﬁgure network
nodes, the software running on these nodes are becoming more and more complex.
Hence, network security increasingly relies on securing management protocols and
nodes in the network. The fact that network nodes are located in protected sites is
no longer a guarantee for security (Dieter, 1999).
“Network security refers to any activity designed to protect a network, speciﬁcally,
these activities protect the usability, reliability, integrity and safety of a network and
data. Eﬀective network security targets a variety of threats and stops them from
entering or spreading on a network” (Cisco, 2014).
Regardless of whether a company is on the Internet or not, security measures must
be applied to the network. These security measures may be as simple as requiring
users to regularly change their passwords or may involve using the network operating
system and third-party utilities to restrict access and enforce policies (Blacharski,
1998).

Issues in Security
Since the advent of computers and networking, diﬀerent forms of cyber attacks
have been in place. Common attack techniques are classiﬁed: Some attackers gain
system knowledge or personal information, such as, spying and phishing. Others
meddle with system designated functions, for example, virus infections, worms and
Trojans. Also, others exhaust the system resources rendering rendering services unavailable. This can be brought about by denial of service (DoS) attack. Diﬀerent
types of network interruptions also exist, for example, land attacks, smurf attacks,
password stealing, social engineering, use of viruses and worms, bugs & indirect accesses, veriﬁcation & protocol failures, information leakage, bot-nets, eavesdropping,
data modiﬁcation, spooﬁng, sniﬃng, software & hardware misuse, TCP hijacking,
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teardrop attacks and so on (Bhavya, 2008). For the purpose of this study, we are
going to focus only on the DoS form of attack.
Considerable research has been completed lately towards virtualization and cloud
security. With server combination and desktop virtualization, essentially more activity stays inside the data center racks, prompting blind spots in network security
appliances. Current network security devices, designed in view of scale-up standards,
can’t keep pace with the expanded bandwidth dispensed to the servers, and the expanding volume of threats at all layers of the network stack. Likewise, high versatile
workloads and expanding intelligence in the virtual and hypervisor layer makes it progressively hard for static network devices to interlock with dynamic policy changes
and on-the-ﬂy re-purposing of resources to serve diﬀerent workloads, applications, or
clients.
The researchers Basak, Toshniwal, Maskalik, and Sequeira (2010) highlights another pattern in the industry to virtualize network security devices inside security
virtual appliances (SVA’s), which can then be placed on hosts, and other distributed
security function for network ﬂows across the cluster. The methodology replaces single choke-point based physical security devices like ﬁrewalls. IP address management,
ﬂow monitoring, and data leakage are monitored using a distributed virtual counterparts running on slices of x86, integrated with compute workloads, with the capacity
to take advantage of traﬃc going through all virtual machines. Cloud computing
can convey both software and hardware as on-demand assets and services over the
internet (Huang & Yang, 2010). Without a doubt, one of the noteworthy concerns in
cloud computing is security.
Wu, Ding, Winer, and Yao (2010) focused on security of virtual networks in virtualized environments. The research presents an outline of security issues in virtual
machines. The issues that exist in a virtual network are additionally being discussed
and analyzed based on Xen platform. The outcome displays an inventive virtual network structure planned to control the intercommunication among virtual machines
incorporated to physical machines with higher security. With distributed systems
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becoming more prevalent in modern computing, there is a need to scale exponentially with their use and integration. Up to this point, the x86 architecture does not
allowed traditional trap-and-emulate virtualization. x86 virtual machine monitors
have rather utilized parallel interpretation of the guest kernel code. Be that as it
may, both intel and AMD have now introduced architectural extensions to support
classical virtualization. The research “comparison of software and hardware methods
for x86 virtualization” compares a current software VMM and another VMM intended
for emerging hardware support. Surprisingly, the hardware VMM frequently shows
lower performance than the software VMM.
Adams and Agesen (2006) conducted a study of software and hardware techniques
for x86 virtualization and studied architectural level events such as page table overhauls, context switches, and I/O; the study discovered their cost incomprehensibly
distinctive among native software VMM, and hardware VMM execution. The research results demonstrates that the hardware support neglects to give a recognizable
performance advantages for two primary reasons. First, it oﬀers no support for MMU
virtualization; second, it neglects to exist with existing software techniques for MMU
virtualization. The study looks ahead to developing methods for addressing the MMU
virtualization issue with regards to hardware-assisted virtualization.
Manohar (2013) surveyed virtualization techniques, types of hypervisors, and
building private clouds with virtualization. It additionally examines the security
of cloud computing and introduced the optical network as an access network and
its devices in the data centers as energy eﬃcient centers. Virtualization assumes a
noteworthy part in helping organizations reduce cost, and in the mean time guarantees enhanced productivity, better utilization, and adaptability of existing hardware.
Reuben (2007) presents a literature on diﬀerent security issues inside virtualization
technologies. The study mainly focuses on open security vulnerabilities that virtualization conveys to the cyber environment. The study focused on security issues that
are unique for virtual machines and security threats that are common to all virtu-
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alization technologies available in the market. The study ﬁnishes up with a several
discourse of a few security vulnerabilities in the virtualized environment.

2.4

Cyber Threats Implementation
Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) is a noticeable threat to cloud and

virtualized environments. Traditional defense approaches cannot be easily applied
to the cloud environment because of their moderately low proﬁciency and large data
space. Thus, (Dou, Chen, & Chen, 2013) exhibited a Conﬁdence-Based Filtering
strategy (CBF). The research method is deployed in two periods; the non-attack
period, and the attack period. More speciﬁcally, legitimate packets are gathered amid
the non-attack period for extracting attribute pairs to produce a nominal proﬁle. The
CBF technique is advanced by computing the score of a speciﬁc packet amid the attack
time frame to decide whether to discard it. In conclusion, extensive simulations are
conducted to assess the feasibility of the CBF method. The outcome demonstrates
that CBF has a high scoring speed, small storage requirement and an acceptable
ﬁltering precision, making it suitable for real-time ﬁltering in cloud environment.
Negi, Mishra, and Gupta (2013) proposes an enhanced CBF approach featuring
a modiﬁcation to the conﬁdence-based ﬁltering technique researched for the cloud
computing environment. It took into account connection designs that mitigate DDoS
attacks in the cloud. The modiﬁcation presents additional bandwidth and tries to
increase the processing speed of victim’s server.
Farahmandian et al. (2013) reviewed and compared the existing methods used to
mitigate DDoS attacks on cloud computing. SYN ﬂooding attacks are an example
of Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack. Early detection is desirable however
traditional passive detection strategies are done in the early stages because of their
dependence on passive sniﬃng an attacking signature. Xiao, Chen, He, and Sha
(2005) captures attacking signatures utilizing an active probing scheme that obtains
the delay of routers by sending packets containing a unique Time-to-Live set for the

22
IP headers. The aftereﬀects of the test are utilized to perform SYN ﬂooding detection,
which is reliable and has minimal overhead. This methodology is more independent
than diﬀerent techniques that require the participation of network devices. Diﬀerent
tests demonstrate that this delay probing approach accurately recognizes half-open
connections caused by SYN ﬂooding attacks from those emerging from diﬀerent causes
at an early stage. The researchers Lonea, Popescu, and Tianﬁeld (2013) focused on
detecting DDoS attack in cloud computing environments. The proposed solution is to
consolidate the evidence obtained from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) deployed in
the virtual machines of the cloud systems with a data fusion methodology on the front
end. In particular, when the attack appears, the VM-based IDS will yield alarms,
which will be stored in the MySQL database set inside the Cloud Fusion Unit (CFU)
of the front end server. The research propose a quantitative solution for analyzing
alerts generated by the IDSs, utilizing the Dempsters Combination Theory (DST)
operations in 3-valued rationale and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) for the mentioned
ﬂooding attacks. At the last step, the solution utilizes the Dempsters combination
rule to fuse evidence from multiple independent sources.
On the topic of DDoS detection, H. Wang, Zhang, and Shin (2002) proposes a
simple and vigorous mechanism for detecting SYN ﬂooding attacks. Rather than
monitoring traﬃc ﬂow at the front (like ﬁrewall or proxy) of a server, they identify
the SYN ﬂooding attacks of LEAF routers that connects end hosts to the Internet. The ease of the detection mechanism lies in the stateless and low computation
overhead, which makes the detection mechanism itself immune to ﬂooding attacks.
The detection mechanism depends on the protocol behavior of TCP SYN-FIN (RST)
pairs, and is an instance of successive change point detection. To make the detection
mechanism insensitive to site and access pattern, a non-parametric cumulative sum
method is applied, thus, making the detection component for the most part relevant
and its deployment much less demanding. The eﬃciency of this detection component
is validated by trace-driven simulations. The evaluation results show that the detection mechanism has short detection precision. Because of its closeness to the ﬂood-
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ing sources, the component not only sets alarm upon detection of continuous SYN
ﬂooding attacks, additionally it uncovers the location of the ﬂooding sources without
resorting to expensive IP trace-back. There have been numerous proposals to shield
against SYN ﬂooding, and some require notable TCP changes. A few arrangements
that endeavor to determine the TCP shortcoming are now publicly available. Ricciulli, Lincoln, and Kakkar (1999) subjectively analyzes these arrangements of TCP
SYN ﬂooding defense. The study reﬁnes the analysis of the random drop approach
and drives a straightforward and general approach to enhance its performance. At
last, the study presents (through both analytical and packet-level simulations) the
eﬃcacy of the random drop approach in a variety of operating conditions.
TCP-based ﬂooding attacks are a typical type of Distributed Denial of Service
(DDoS) attacks that abuse network resources and can result in serious threats to
the Internet (Chen & Yeung, 2006). Incorporating IP spooﬁng-random, subnet, and
ﬁxed varieties makes it harder to shield against attacks. Subnet-spooﬁng is the most
troublesome type of DDoS to counteract. Chen and Yeung (2006) proposed a simple
and eﬃcient method to detect and protect against TCP SYN ﬂooding attacks under
various IP spooﬁng types, including subnet spooﬁng. The method makes use of a
capacity eﬃcient data structure and change-point detection method to distinguish
complete three-way TCP handshakes from incomplete ones. Simulation experiments
reliably demonstrate that the strategy is both productive and compelling in protecting
against TCP-based ﬂooding attacks under various IP spooﬁng types.
Shin, Kim, and Jang (2005) proposes D-SAT: detecting SYN ﬂooding attack by
two-stage statistical approach. A basic and robust way to detect SYN ﬂooding attacks
is by monitoring the network activity. Rather than dealing with all ongoing traﬃc
on the network, D-SAT only monitors SYN count and the proportion between SYN
and other TCP packets. D-SAT identiﬁes SYN ﬂooding and discovers victims more
precisely in its second stage. To make the recognition mechanism and detection more
easy, D-SAT utilizes a cumulative sum methodology in statistical process control. It
makes the recognition mechanism more applicable and easier to implement. D-SAT
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additionally uses AFM (Aggregation Flow Management) to identify victims quickly
and precisely. The trace-driven simulation results shows that D-SAT system is reliable
and easy to deploy and D-SAT also demonstrate that it recognizes SYN ﬂooding
precisely and ﬁnds attack within a short detection time.

Denial of Service
A denial of service (DoS) attack is an attack that clogs up so much resources
(CPU, Memory etc) from the target system. This usually causes the system to crash,
reboot, or generally deny any services to legitimate clients. DoS attacks are extremely
normal; to be certain, every server can undoubtedly experience such an attack at any
given time. In a situation where the attack is coordinated across many hijacked
system (zombies) by a single attacker (master), the attack is referred to as DDoS
(Carl et al., 2006). DDoS threats come in many varieties, some of which target the
underlying server infrastructure. Others exploit vulnerabilities in applications and
communication protocols. Unlike other kind of cyberattacks, DDoS are typically
launched to establish a long-term foothold and hijack sensitive information. Denial
of service assaults do not attempt to breach your security perimeter. Rather, they
attempt to make your services, website, and servers unavailable to legitimate users. In
some cases, however, DoS is also used as a smokescreen for other malicious activities,
or to take down security appliances (e.g., web application ﬁrewalls).

Classification of Denial of Service
DoS attacks can be classiﬁed into ﬁve categories (Douligeris & Mitrokotsa, 2004).
These categories are: Network Device level, OS level, Application level, Data Flood,
and Protocol Feature attack.
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Fig. 2.1. DoS & DDoS Attack Types

Fig. 2.2. Classiﬁcation of DoS attacks

Network Layer Attacks - Layer 3 DoS
A DoS attack at the network level is caused either by exploiting a bug, software
vulnerability, or exhausting the hardware resources of the network device (Waziri Jr
& Shropshire, 2015).
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Layer 3 attacks utilize specialized packets designed to cause resource intensive
processing, slow response on target devices, or the disruption of TCP state information. These attacks inﬂuence issues in Layer 3 protocols and devices in order to cause
signiﬁcant disruption with much less attacker bandwidth than a volumetric attack.
It is moderately simple; nonetheless, one needs to ﬁlter most Layer 3 attacks as they
can be ﬁltered with simple signatures and usually consume much less bandwidth than
a pure volumetric attack (Waziri Jr & Shropshire, 2015).
Attack vectors in this category include UDP ﬂood, SYN ﬂood, NTP ampliﬁcation, DNS ampliﬁcation, and more. Any of these can be used to prevent access to
servers, while also causing severe operational damages, such as account suspension
and massive overage charges.
DDoS attacks are almost always high-traﬃc events, commonly measured in gigabits per second (Gbps) or packets per second (Pps). A large network layer assault
can exceed 600 Gbps 2 ; however, 20 to 40 Gbps are enough to completely shut down
most network infrastructures.

Application Layer Attacks - Layer 7 DoS
DoS attacks at this level attempt to make a machine or service out of order either
by exploiting particular bugs in network applications that are running on the target
host or by utilizing such applications to deplete the resources of the victim. An
example of this is the finger-bomb.
Layer 7 attacks exploit application layer commands that cause slow processing
or crashes with the goal of disrupting the service of a targeted application. Layer 7
attacks normally target HTTP; either HTTP request that cause the web application
to perform resource exhaustive processing or vulnerability in unpatched versions of
the web servers. These attacks are considerably more hard to proﬁle and ﬁlter at the
network, and frequently require changes to web applications themselves. Basic Layer
2

Arbor Network Report 2015
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7 attacks include Slowlirs, R-U-Dead-Yet, and XDoS (zadjmool, 2013). Among other
attack vectors in this category includes HTTP ﬂoods, slow attacks (e.g., Slowloris or
RUDY), and DNS query ﬂood attacks.
The size of application layer attacks is normally measured in request per second
(Rps), with no more than 50 to 100 Rps required to exhaust most average sized
websites (Davidowicz, 1999). In this dissertation, we implemented this type of attack.

Motivation & Causes
The purposes of DDoS attacks vary. A small percentage (on the positive side) of
them can be accidental, caused by a badly conﬁgured system or as a demonstration
to potential customers of DDoS protection solutions. However, on the negative side;
there is often a personal intention behind the majority of these attacks. Some can
be used as a diversion for attackers who want to try and steal information from
certain systems, or for ﬁnancial market manipulation or even fame, because hackers
might want to boast that they managed to successfully attack a well known target or
competitor. Moreover, online gaming, gambling, and social network related reasons
are also motives behind such attacks. One of the biggest motivations behind DDoS
attacks is “hacktivism”. Hacktivism is mainly driven by political and ideological
disputes.

Severity
The biggest attack reported by a respondent in 2015 was 500 Gbps, with diﬀerent
respondents reporting attacks of 450 Gbps, 425 Gbps, and 337 Gbps. This proceeds
with the pattern of signiﬁcant development in the top-end size of DDoS attacks yearafter-year. In 2014, 20 percent of respondents reported attacks of more than 50 Gbps.
Interestingly in 2015 about one-fourth of the same respondents report attack sizes of
more than 100 Gbps, stressing the scale of the DDoS problem. Clients remain the
main focus in more than 66% of DDoS attacks. Once more, the extent of respondents
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seeing attacks focusing on cloud-based service has increased from 19% in 2013, to
29% in 2014, and to 33% in 2015.

Fig. 2.3. DDoS Peak Attack Size Year after Year

Attackers have proceeded with the 2014 pattern of utilizing reﬂection/ampliﬁcation
strategies to exploit vulnerabilities in NTP, SSDP, and diﬀerent protocols. Numerous
respondents reported events at 200+ Gbps. This continues the trend of signiﬁcant
growth in the top-end size of DDoS attacks yearly.

Implementation
For DoS attacks to be implemented, an attack needs to be perpetrated towards the
target. Depending on the type of victim, there are diﬀerent forms of DoS attacks. For
ethical reasons, this dissertation does not provide a guide on how to implement DoS
attacks; however we presented the diﬀerent forms of attacks as follows (Mirkovic &
Reiher, 2004): UDP Flood, ICMP (Ping) Flood, SYN Flood, Ping of Death, Slowloris,
NTP Ampliﬁcation, HTTP Flood, etc.
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HTTP Flood Attack
HTTP Flooding is an application layer attack. It overwhelms a target web server
with a substantial amount of HTTP requests (Byers et al., 2004; Estevez-Tapiador,
Garcı́a-Teodoro, & Dı́az-Verdejo, 2005), slowing or completely disrupting the regular
web server traﬃc (Das, Sharma, & Bhattacharyya, 2011). In this dissertation, we
implement a HTTP Flood attack. During this attack, an attacker exploits the HTTP
GET or POST request sent when a HTTP client, like a web browser, talks to an
application or server.
The attacker uses a botnet to send the victim’s server a large amount of GET (pictures or scripts) or POST (ﬁle or forms) request with the expectation of overwhelming
its resources and capabilities. The victims web server gets inundated, attempting to
answer every request from the botnet, which drives it to allocate its maximum resources to handle the traﬃc. This prevents legitimate requests from reaching the
server, causing a denial of service.

2.5

Commercial DDoS Defense Architectures
As a result of the various DDoS targets, types of attacks and severity, it is neces-

sary to have methods to mitigate these attacks and help secure the availability of critical services. Nowadays, there are diﬀerent popular commercial mitigation/protection
providers that attempt to accomplish the problem posed by DDoS attacks. However,
most commercial providers do not successfully achieve their stated goals. Commercial
mitigation providers can provide a high detection success rate, but they tend to be
very costly depending on the size of the attack traﬃc; also, they tend to have issues with clients regarding traﬃc being routed to the providers, which violates client
privacy.
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Fig. 2.4. HTTP GET & POST Flood Attack

2.5.1

Mitigation Approach

Discarding traﬃc altogether is not considered a mitigation practice, considering
that legitimate traﬃc can also be dismissed. An Access Control List of ﬁrewalls is a
choice for protection; however, this is only successful in ﬁltering already known attacks
by examining the protocols used. DDoS attacks are becoming more sophisticated,
using valid protocols, and rendering the ﬁltering process unsuccessful when it comes
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to SYN, SYN/ACK, and others forms of DDoS attacks. Another way of using routers
as a form of protection is to use Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding (uRPF), which
can be used to block IP addresses outside of the target’s subnet. Nonetheless, if an
attacker utilizes spoofed IP addresses from the same subnet, little to nothing can be
done. Also, legitimate end-user traﬃc is blocked and the DDoS attack succeeds.
According to Cisco, another popular opinion is that ﬁrewalls and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) are inadequate forms of protection against DDoS attacks (Cisco,
2004). Firewalls are used inline and attackers target their low session handling abilities. Usually, they do not ﬁlter spoofed traﬃc and they can also be used to reject
traﬃc from certain protocols. However, the attacking side can still use valid protocols
during a DDoS attack. The same applies to IDS; they can provide excellent detection
for Application Layer attacks but not against valid protocols. Moreover, as the term
suggests, IDSs only function as a detection mechanism.

2.5.2

Mitigation Techniques

Contrary to privacy issues, commercial solutions have a high success rate in mitigation. Such companies oﬀer diﬀerent types of plans according to clients’ needs
and budgets. Services such as prevention, monitoring and traﬃc handling can be
provided. There are mainly two diﬀerent types of traﬃc handling correlated to the
layers of attack; Layer 3/4 and Layer 7 solutions (Incapsula, 2014).
Layer 3/4 mitigation techniques are based on Border Gateway Protocol (BGP)
IP address range swings. The target of the DDoS attack can decide to stop announcing their IP address range to the global Internet; in turn, that particular company
announces it for them, so that they receive all of the traﬃc intended for the client,
whether it is malicious or not. This operates in a distributed model with data centers across the world; traﬃc is then washed as it goes through special purpose built
appliances to ﬁlter illegitimate traﬃc out with the use of speciﬁc algorithms. Once
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the traﬃc is washed it is rerouted back to the client (On-Ramping) over a Generic
Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel.
Layer 7 mitigation techniques also function in a distributed model. By having
multiple data centers at diﬀerent Internet Exchanges, clients can point the DNS entry
of their websites to these companies who, in return, handle the requests where each
packet is inspected. Based on the signatures, illegitimate traﬃc can be detected and
discarded. Next, legitimate traﬃc is sent back to end-user browsers based on their
geographical location.

Fig. 2.5. Commercial-Based DDoS Mitigation Technique

Due to the immense amount of available bandwidth, both legitimate and malicious
traﬃc is accepted. The traﬃc is then washed using algorithms to examine which
packet protocols are used. The DDoS traﬃc is discarded and the legitimate traﬃc is
sent to the Critical Service Infrastructure and returned to the end-users.
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2.5.3

Drawbacks of Commercial Solutions

Few commercial mitigation techniques prove to be eﬃcient; many are imperfect,
and also depending on the customer, they can be quite expensive (Verisign, 2014a).
First and foremost, the algorithms used to monitor traﬃc are not ﬂawless, which
means that along with DDoS traﬃc, sometimes legitimate traﬃc is discarded. These
mitigation solutions oﬀer DDoS detection and contact the client when they detect a
signiﬁcant rise in their traﬃc to ask if they should take measures (Agarwal, Dawson,
& Tryfonas, 2003). Up to thirty minutes can pass after the detection has provided
results and the BCP swing of the IP range has taken place, during which the victim
is under attack and unable to react (Verisign, 2014b).
Application Layer solutions have a diﬀerent disadvantage. Because of their distributed model which can have a replica of the client’s web service in any of their
data centers, it is rather unsafe to use for services that implement SSL due to the fact
that the Private Keys need to be shared. For small customers, this might not be an
issue; however, when customers are ﬁnancial and governmental organization, privacy
issues are far more consequential. Recently a solution to this problem was developed
(CloudFlare, n.d.) which tries to provide a mitigation solution without sharing Private Keys. Nevertheless, the matter of privacy still remains when bringing a third
party into the equation. End-users of critical services trust that their ﬁnancial and
private data is handled by an entity that is stable and impermeable.
Lastly, these companies oﬀer contracts based on bandwidth. If a customer, for example, chooses for contract of mitigating attacks of up to 40 Gbps and it is attacked
by a larger DDoS attack than the terms of the contract, the prices of mitigation
increase excessively. According to security ﬁrm Imperva, sixty percent of US companies experienced DDoS attacks during 2013. DDoS mitigation solutions can cost
from $5,000 to over $100,000 US dollars per hour (Incapsula, n.d.). Furthermore,
these ﬁgures do not include possible damages to credibility and customer satisfac-
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tion. The consequences of a DDoS attack can thus be disastrous for any organization
or company.

2.5.4

Prevention & Response

The primary line of defense is to ensure DDoS doesn’t take place. Hosts must
be securely shielded from substantial and expert attack implants. There are in fact
known signatures and ﬁltering methods to recognize these attacks. Another method
is monitoring network traﬃc for known attack messages sent amongst attackers and
masters. On the active side, cyber-informants and cyber-spies can be used to intercept
attack plans. For instance, Gibson clearly showed how he eﬀectively spied on attack
plans within a group of agents (Gibson, 2001).
This line of defense alone is clearly deﬁcient. There are always don’t care users and
careless clients who leave their devices vulnerable to DDoS agent implants. Internet
Service Providers (ISPs) and enterprise networks do not have motive to monitor for
attack packets. Besides, spying on attack plans, such as the one presented in (Gibson,
2001) requires an in-depth knowledge of speciﬁc methods of launching DDoS attacks,
which may also be changed later on, to avoid spying (Chang, 2002).
Attack source traceback and identiﬁcation is normally an after-the-fact response
to a DDoS attack. IP traceback refers to the problem, as well as the solution, of the
actual source of any packet sent across the Internet without relying on the source
information from the packet. There are mostly two approaches to deal with the IP
traceback issue. One is for routers to record information about packets for later traceback request (Snoeren et al., 2001). Another is for routers to send extra information
about the packets to the packet destinations via either the packets (Savage, Wetherall,
Karlin, & Anderson, 2000) or another channel, such as ICMP messages.
However, it is in-feasible to utilize IP traceback to stop a continuous DDoS attack.
First, current IP traceback solutions are not always able to trace packet origins (e.g.,
those behind ﬁrewalls and network address translators). Additionally, IP traceback is
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ineﬀective towards reﬂector attacks in which the attack packets originate from legitimate sources. Regardless of the fact that the attack sources can be eﬀectively traced,
preventing them from sending attack packets is another troublesome task, particularly when they are scattered in diﬀerent autonomous systems (AS). Nevertheless, IP
traceback could be very useful in recognizing the attacker and collecting evidence for
post-attack law enforcement (Chang, 2002).

2.6

Flooding Mitigation
A Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack utilizing Botnets became widely

used in the Internet because of its eﬃciency and easy implementation. Zahid, Belmekki,
and Mezrioui (2012) presents a new architecture for detecting DDoS/Brute forcing
attack and destroying the botnet behind. The architecture stops DDoS attacks based
on Botnet command and control and identiﬁes the botmaster machine. The architecture is composed of DDoS attacks detection agents, spies and central agents that
coordinate with each other during the attack trace-back process. The trace-back
procedure depends on hacking techniques in order to inﬁltrate the Botnet and get information about the attacker and the bots utilized. The architecture is intended for
Internet Service Providers (Zahid et al., 2012). Botnets are the predominant mechanisms for facilitating the distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on computer
networks or applications. To date, Botnet-based DDoS attacks on the application
layer are the latest and most problematic trend in network security threats. Botnetbased DDoS attacks in the application layer limit resources, shorten revenue, and
yield client dissatisfaction.
DDoS attacks are among the most troublesome problems to resolve online, especially when the target is a Web Server. Alomari, Manickam, Gupta, Karuppayah,
and Alfaris (2012) introduces a thorough research of Botnet-based DDoS attacks on
application layers, particularly on the web server and decreased incidents of such attacks. Botnet-based DDoS attack incidents and signiﬁcant revenue losses were also
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described. The study provides a better comprehension of the problem, current solution space, and future research scope to safeguard against such attacks.
These days, we are witnessing a signiﬁcant increment in distributed denial-ofservice (DDoS) attacks that ﬂood victims from diﬀerent sources. Intrusion detection
and ﬁltering are required mechanisms to combat against these attacks and properly
secure networks. Nonetheless, the current detection technique for DDoS attacks works
in isolation. Saad, Nait-Abdesselam, and Serhrouchni (2008) proposed a productive
and collaborative architecture that takes into consideration the placement and cooperation of defense techniques to properly address major security challenges. The
utilization of content-based, distributed hash-table algorithm allows improved scalability and load balancing of an entire system. The architecture has been executed on
ISA entities using table protocol with a promising performance.
Harris, Konikoﬀ, and Petersen (2013) gives a survey of the DDoS landscape and
analyzes the application of the kill-chain concept to the DDoS threat. Utilizing the
concept of detect, deny, disrupt, degrade and destroy. The paper investigates ways
that this chain can be disrupted. An outline of the emerging DDoS threat is provided
and considerations are oﬀered for extra technology and research with the potential to
signiﬁcantly reduce the current DDoS threat.
Xuan, Chellappan, Wang, and Wang (2004) analyzed the secure overlay services
architecture under intelligent DDoS attacks. They proposed a secure overlay service
architecture to provide reliable communication amongst customers and a target under DDoS attacks. The SOS architecture utilizes an arrangement of overlay nodes
arranged in three hierarchical layers that control access to the target. Even though
the architecture is novel and functions admirably under basic over-ﬂooding based
attacks, it is observed to be vulnerable under more intelligent attacks. The architecture works by introducing more layering ﬂexibility to the original architecture. To
understand the impacts of the amount of layers, neighbors per node and the node
distribution per layer under these two attack models, two intelligent DDoS attack
models are deﬁned and an analytical methodology was developed. The result clearly
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shows that performance is indeed sensitive to the design features that interact with
each other to impact overall system performance.
Keromytis, Misra, and Rubenstein (2004) proposes a design called secure overlay
services (SOS) that proactively prevents denial of service (DoS) attacks, targeted towards supporting emergency services or similar communications. The design utilizes
a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via hashing and ﬁltering. It minimize the likelihood of successful attacks by: 1. performing intensive ﬁltering near
the protected network edges and pushing the attack point perimeter into the core
network, where routers can deal with the volume of attack traﬃc; and 2. introducing
randomness and anonymity into the forwarding architecture, making it diﬃcult for an
attacker to target nodes along the way to a particular SOS-protected network. Utilizing basic analytical models, the research evaluates the possibility that an attacker
can eﬀectively launch a DoS attack against an SOS protected network. The analysis
shows that such an architecture reduces the probability of a successful attack to a
minimal probability. The performance measurements using a prototype implementation shows an increment in end-to-end latency by a factor of two for the general case,
and an average recovery time of less than 10 seconds.
Beitollahi and Deconinck (2012) analyzed well-known countermeasures against
distributed denial of service attacks. The study provided an in-depth analysis of each
DDoS countermeasure and explained the strengths and challenges of each technique.
The paper designed a countermeasure against the defense mechanism from the attackers perspective. The study is assumed to help potential victims choose appropriate
countermeasures against DDoS attacks based on the methodology presented, as well
as the requirements they need to deploy the techniques.
Tariq, Malik, Abdulrazak, and Hong (2011) researched the packet ﬂood attack
and presented a collaborative peer to peer defense mechanism for DDoS attacks. The
proposed solution identiﬁes the attack at the victim edge router and sends alert messages to its neighboring nodes which permits them to proactively defend themselves.
Simulation results demonstrate the eﬃciency of the solution, with less false positives
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at the victim edge router and less damage to the network due to the proactive defense
approach.
Tupakula and Varadharajan (2003) studied counteracting DDoS attacks in multiple ISP domains using routing arbiter architecture. They focus on preventing DDoS
attacks in multiple ISP domains. Other methods used cluster analysis. K. Lee, Kim,
Kwon, Han, and Kim (2008) proposes a strategy for proactive detection of DDoS
attack by exploiting its architecture; the selection of handlers, agents, communication, compromise, and attack. They proposed DDoS attack detection method using
cluster analysis. The study investigated the strategies of DDoS attack and then chose
variables based on these features. After that, a cluster analysis for proactive detection of the attack was performed. The researchers experimented with a 2000 DARPA
Intrusion Detection Scenario Speciﬁc Data Set in order to assess their methodology.
The outcomes shows that each phase of the attack scenario is well partitioned and
can detect precursors of a DDoS attack as well as the attack itself.
Garg and Chawla (2011) used data mining instead of cluster analysis. Garg and
Chawla (2011) present various signiﬁcant areas where data mining techniques seem to
be a strong approach for detecting and preventing DDoS. Douligeris and Mitrokotsa
(2004) presents a simple approach to handling DDoS problems by creating a classiﬁcation of DDoS attacks and DDoS mechanisms. Each attack and defense system
category are described and the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed scheme
are outlined. The objective of the paper is to introduce some order into the current attack and defense mechanisms, so that a better understanding of DDoS attacks can be
achieved; also advanced and more eﬀective algorithms and procedures to combat these
attacks may be created. Koutepas, Stamatelopoulos, and Maglaris (2004) introduces
Distributed management architecture for cooperative detection and reaction to DDoS
attacks. Koutepas et al. (2004) proposes a cooperative intrusion detection framework
focused on mitigating DDoS attack by introducing distributed overlay early-warning
network. The objective is to minimize detection and reaction times and automate
response, involving as many networks as possible along the attack path, which can
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then be detected locally without trace-back procedures. The fundamental building
block is the cooperative anti-DDoS entity and a modular software system deployed
in each participating network domain that supports secure message exchanges and
local responses tailored to individual site policies. The study explains the operation
and deployment of prototype, provides a survey of the approaches against DDoS and
compares the approaches to related work.
Pushback is a tool for mitigating distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks.
DDoS attacks are treated as a congested-control problem, but because most congestions are caused by malicious hosts not obeying traditional end-to-end congestion
control, the issue must be taken care of by routers. Functionality is added to each
router to detect and preferentially drop packets that most likely are attributed with
an attack. Upstream routers are likewise conﬁgured to drop such packets (henceforth
the term pushback) in order to transfer legitimate traﬃc. J. Ioannidis and Bellovin
(2002) presents an architecture for pushback, its execution under FreeBSD, and suggestions for how such a system can be implemented in routers (J. Ioannidis & Bellovin,
2002). Ando, Miwa, Kadobayashi, and Shinoda (2008) presents a load balancing system for mitigating DDoS attacks using live migration of virtual machines. Ando et
al. (2008) applies virtual machine monitor to modify the virtualized operating system, and afterward outlines the detailed countermeasure for DoS attacks utilizing live
migration.
Honeypot is a trap used to communicate with potential attackers to divert, detect,
or prevent such attacks and guarantee uninterrupted availability of service. Deshpande (2015) prevented distributed denial of service attacks using virtualized honeypots. Deshpande (2015) gives insight into the issues introduced by distributed denial
of service attacks, current solutions that use honeypots, and how a mesh of virtualized
honeypots can be used to mitigate distributed denial of service attacks. Srivatsa, Iyengar, Yin, and Liu (2008) mitigated application-level denial of service attacks in web
server using a client-transparent approach. Srivatsa et al. (2008) proposes handling
DoS attacks by using a twofold approach. First, the researcher performs admission
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control to limit the amount of concurrent clients served by the online service, invisible to unauthorized clients by hiding the port number on which the service accepts
incoming request. Second, admission control carries out a congestion control which
allows admitted clients to allocate more resources to other approved clients. Congestion control is achieved by setting a client’s priority level in response to the client’s
requests in a way that incorporates application-level semantics. The article displays
a detailed assessment of the proposed arrangement utilizing two sample applications,
Apache HTTPD and the TPCW benchmark (running on Apache Tomcat and IBM
DB2). The study demonstrates that the proposed solution results in low performance
overhead and is resilient to DoS attacks.
The need to keep an attacker unmindful of attack mitigation eﬀorts is a very
important component of protection against denial of services (DoS) and distributed
denial of services (DDoS) attacks, because it helps to dissuade attackers from changing
their attack patterns. DDoS protection can be achieved in two parts. The ﬁrst is a
fake server that provides a service function or receives attack traﬃc as a substitute
for a legitimate server. The second is a decoy network that restricts attack traﬃc to
the peripherals of a network, or reroutes attack activity to fake servers.
Okada, Hazeyama, and Kadobayashi (2014) proposes the use of a two-stage map
table expansion Locator/ID Separation Protocol (LISP) to understand the fake network. It explains and showed how LISP can be used to deploy an oblivious DDoS
mitigation mechanism by adding an extension to the LISP Map Server. Together
with fake servers, this approach can end DDoS activity on the ingress end of a LISPenabled network. At last, the paper veriﬁed the eﬀectiveness of the proposed mechanism through simulated DDoS attacks on a simple network topology. The test results
demonstrate that the mechanism could be deployed within a few seconds, and the
attack traﬃc can be terminated without incurring overhead on the MapServer.
Shameli-Sendi, Pourzandi, Fekih-Ahmed, and Cheriet (2015) uses taxonomy of
distributed denial of service mitigation approaches for cloud computing to concentrate
on how to mitigate DDoS attacks. It presents a new taxonomy of DDoS mitigation,
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then discusses the principle elements of existing DDoS mitigation approaches and
clariﬁes their functionalities in the cloud environment. Afterwards, it indicates how
the current DDoS systems ﬁt into the network topology of the cloud. Finally, the
survey paper presented some of these DDoS mechanisms in detail, and compares their
behavior in the cloud. The goal is to show how these characteristics bring an original
perspective into existing DDoS mechanisms, and give researchers new experiences
into how to mitigate DDoS attacks in cloud computing. Bhardwaj, Subrahmanyam,
Avasthi, and Sastry (2015) proposes three tier network architecture to mitigate DDoS
attacks on hybrid cloud environments. They use a multi-tiered network design based
on hybrid cloud solution that has premise solution acceptable to the organization’s
IT security and operations team, as well as public cloud infrastructure capable of
handling large sized DDoS attacks targeted towards hybrid cloud servers.
Miao, Yu, and Jain (2014) highlights a few novel elements and advancement pattern among DDoS attacks: 1) Large-scale. These attacks have the volume of up to
hundred gigabits per second against a single cloud service. 2) Diverse attacks. The
attacks range from network-layer (e.g. SYN surge, UDP surge) to application-layer
(e.g. HTTP GET, SQL infusion) with varied characteristics for volume, number of
connections, and packet header signature (e.g., TCP ﬂag, port). 3) Fast ramp-up
rate. The attack traﬃc ramps up quickly and inﬂuences the target cloud service
usually within a minute. In response to these challenges, the attack detection and
mitigation system needs to: 1) have adequate capacity to handle attack volume: 2)
support the detection of diverse range of attacks: and 3) have accurate and quick
attack detection with low damage to legitimate traﬃc.
To identify attacks, cloud operators usually use commercial hardware devices,
such as Firewalls, IDS and DDoS-protection tools in the network. There are three
issues with these hardware boxes. First, these hardware devices cannot address overwhelming attacks in cloud scale. For instance, Firewall and IDS look at the states
and detailed signature of packets. They cannot handle attacks with high volume.
DDoS-protection appliances verify only signiﬁcant traﬃc at the network-layer; they
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can address larger attack volumes, but are not capable of handling virtual scale attacks of hundred of gigabits per second traﬃc. Second, these hardware boxes present
unfavorable cost and capacity trade-oﬀs. For example, the DDoS-protection appliance
typically costs up to a million dollars per box annually. Third, since these devices
run vendor speciﬁc software, they limit how operators can conﬁgure them to handle
the increasing diversity of attacks.
There are commercial attack mitigation services (CloudFlare, Prolexic etc.,) that
redirect web service and enterprise traﬃc through a dedicate high-capacity network
for attacks detection and mitigation. However, most clients do not want their traﬃc
to be re-routed considering the private concerns (Miao et al., 2014).
To address this issue, one paper proposes another paradigm for attack-preventionas-a-service that uses commodity VMs for attack detection and mitigation. It introduces the NIMBUS service, which combines the elasticity of cloud computing
resources with the algorithm found in software-deﬁned networks (SDN). NIMBUS
scales resource usage with traﬃc requests, to handle diverse attack eﬃciently and
without the exposure of private clients traﬃc (Miao et al., 2014).

2.7

Chapter Summary
Indispensable research and studies have been conducted regarding the Information

Security ﬁeld as a whole. Everyday new threats and defense mechanisms evolve, and
research is being conducted to understand the problems and provide solutions. In
this chapter, we reviewed several studies relating to this dissertation. The purpose
of this related literature is to understand the current state of the problem we are
trying to solve. To the best of our knowledge, research has yet to address the issue
of network downtime as a result of ﬁrewall failures. However, a number of studies
that addresses DoS attacks, network security and ﬁrewall conﬁgurations have been
conducted. Based on these studies, we decided to implement the proposed study.
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We also explained how commercial DDoS mitigation solutions are sophisticated
techniques; but, depending on the attack and the target, they may not always be
suﬃcient. One major draw-back of commercial-based solutions is the fact that they
are also susceptible to attack. Attackers are ﬁnding ways to inﬁltrate DDoS mitigation
companies. Once an attacker bypasses these commercial companies, it becomes much
easier to gain access to a network. Also there is an issue of having third parties monitor
network traﬃc; therefore, we conclude that the best DDoS mitigation technique is
for an innovative solution.
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3. TRADITIONAL ARCHITECTURE PERFORMANCE
TEST
3.1

Introduction
The Internet is an exciting and informative place to browse and explore. It is

the great frontier and grandiose achievement of mankind. In reality, the World Wide
Web is merely a collection of routers and servers that make up the largest wide-area
network (WAN) in recorded history. The collection of networking gears provides mail
servers, websites, and other information storage and retrieval systems which are all
connected to the Internet and accessible to every person connected. It has even been
said that the Internet contains the collective institutional knowledge of mankind.
The rapid expansion of the internet has provided tremendous opportunities to
access an unparalleled amount of data. An organization connects to the internet to
gain access to information and to share information with the public; once a company
connects its private network to the internet, that organizations private information
becomes vulnerable to hackers. When private networks are connected to the internet,
the risk are great. However, using some security measures, one can share public
information and still protect private information. One of these measures is to install
a ﬁrewall between the private network and the internet (Blacharski, 1998).
A ﬁrewall is a security device that sits on the edge of your Internet connection
and functions as an Internet Border Security Oﬃcer. It constantly monitors all incoming and outgoing connection traﬃc (Ierace, Urrutia, & Bassett, 2005; Thomas &
Stoddard, 2011).
The use of ﬁrewalls is no longer conﬁned to servers, websites, or commercial companies. Even if you simply dial your ISP or use PPP (Point-to-Point protocol) to surf
the internet, you simply cannot do so without a ﬁrewall.
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In other words, a ﬁrewall acts as a shield to protect your system from untrusted,
non-reliable systems connected to the Internet. Conceptually, it drives from the
ﬁrewalls-barriers made of ﬁre-resistant material-used in vehicles. A ﬁrewall on your
PC, however, listens to all ports on your system for any attempts deﬁned by set
of rules. To phrase it more technically; a ﬁrewall is a piece of software, hardware,
or both that allows only selected packets to pass from the internet to your private
network or system. There are diﬀerent types of ﬁrewalls and ﬁrewall generations. For
the purpose of this dissertation, we focus on Hardware and Virtual based ﬁrewalls
that belong to the Third Generation of ﬁrewalls.

Firewall Appliances (Hardware-Based)
These are ﬁrewalls that come hardened in a box. These types of ﬁrewalls provide
services from a host attached to the internal network using a separate router. In this
architecture, packet ﬁltering provides the primary security, preventing people from
going around proxy servers to make direct connections.

Host Firewalls (Virtual-Based)
These are ﬁrewalls that are installed on hosts themselves. These ﬁrewalls are
installed just like an OS. They are mostly installed on servers. They are normally
used in conjunction with other ﬁrewalls.

Third Generation Firewalls - SMLI
Stateful Multi-Layer Inspection (SMLI) represents a third generation of ﬁrewall
technology. This new class of ﬁrewall can be applied internally and externally, over
diﬀerent protocol boundaries, and with numerous advanced functions. SMLI is similar
to the application gateway model; it examines all seven layers of the OSI model.
Instead of relying on a proxy, SMLI relies on a traﬃc screening algorithm optimized
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for high throughput. Each packet is examined and compared against known states
of friendly packets. SMLI examines the entire packet (both address and application
data). Because SMLI does not use a proxy, it overcomes the performance problems
of the application gateway model.
The SMLI solution enables all applications to run natively over the ﬁrewall, because no proxies or modiﬁcations are necessary. The user also does not face additional
passwords or validation procedures, so the solution is transparent to the end user
(Blacharski, 1998).

Access Controls
All information that ﬂows across the Internet uses TCP/IP. In turn, this information is sent in small pieces known as packets. In the early days of the internet,
ﬁltering based on packets was common; in many cases, routers in many networks still
use packet ﬁltering. The methods used to conﬁgure and deploy packet ﬁlters on Cisco
ASA and routers is known as an access control list (ACL). There are two main types
of ACLs: the standard ACL, which ﬁlters based on IP address, and extended ACLs,
which look further into packet headers (Thomas & Stoddard, 2011). An access list
is essentially a list of conditions that categorize packets. They can be really helpful
when you need to exercise control over network traﬃc. An access list is the tool of
choice for decision making in packet ﬁltering (Waziri Jr, 2014).
One of the most common and easy to understand uses of the access list is ﬁltering
unwanted packets when implementing security policies. Access to the internet brings
corporations the advantage of widespread access to share information. However, it
also brings the risk of attack and unauthorized access. Access control is a critical
part of security policy that must be implemented in the ﬁrewall (Panko, 2010).
Access control policy speciﬁes what and who can enter or exit the corporate network. To maintain access control, the security administrator must have a clear picture
of all services and applications available. Earlier packet ﬁltering routers could not
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do this task because they were unaware of applications. Second generation ﬁrewalls,
or application proxies, are application-aware, but consume a great deal of overhead.
Later technologies use stateful inspection and other advanced techniques build on this
application-layer awareness, while providing faster support for new services. Access
control should not only address what can pass into the network, but should also allow
the security admin to be able to the specify rules for what time each user can access
which service. The two main types of access lists are as follows:

Standard Access Lists
This uses just the source IP address in an IP packet as the condition test. All
choices depend on the source IP address. This implies standard access lists essentially
allow or deny a whole suite of protocols. They don’t recognize the numerous types of
IP packets, for example, Web, Telnet, UDP, etc.

Extended Access Lists
Extended access lists can assess other ﬁelds in the layer 3 and 4 headers of an
IP packet. They can evaluate source and destination IP addresses, the protocol ﬁeld
in the Network layer header, and the port number at the Transport layer header.
This gives extended access lists the capacity to make more in-depth inspection and
granular decisions when controlling traﬃc. More in-depth description about standard
and extended access lists is available in Cisco books.

3.2

Problem Statement
Information security professionals ﬁnd themselves working against misconceptions

and popular opinions formed from incomplete data, for example, the possibility that
internal network security can be secured simply by deploying a ﬁrewall. A ﬁrewall
is a perimeter defense and it is not designed to combat the threat within. First and

48
Second Generation ﬁrewalls do not secure against malicious code issues like viruses
and Trojan horses (Garﬁnkel, Spaﬀord, & Schwartz, 2003; NSTISSC, 2000; Smith,
2015), although some are capable of scanning for telltale signs. Conﬁguring packetﬁltering rules has a tendency to be a complicated process, in the course of which errors
can easily occur leading to holes in the defense. In addition, testing the conﬁgured
rules has a tendency to be lengthy and a diﬃcult process due to the shortcomings of
current testing tools. Ordinary packet-ﬁltering routers cannot enforce some security
policies simply because the necessary information is unavailable.
Conﬁguring a ﬁrewall can be troublesome when the goal is to guarantee maximum
security and functionality. Fortunately, most decent ﬁrewalls now come with a reasonable defaults access list. Some say you only need a hardware ﬁrewall. The issue is
that no ﬁrewall can prevent legitimate traﬃc from any source (wanted or unwanted).
This is potentially particularly problematic if you have ﬁle or print sharing enabled,
considering attackers out there are testing all the time for this exploitable back door
into a computer system.
Because of the known issues with ﬁrewalls, which is not having the ability to
conﬁgure access control that would mitigate DDoS at the same time allow legitimate
traﬃc to pass through. Firewalls are prone to DDoS attacks. From our literature
review, we know that ﬁrewall performance depends on its available resources. DDoS
attack exhaust available resources from its target. We decided to ﬁnd a way to mitigate DDoS attacks that target ﬁrewalls. First, we started by testing the performance
of a hardware ﬁrewall to see how much it can endure.
A paper on this work has been published in the proceedings of IEEE SouthEastCon
2015 (Waziri Jr & Shropshire, 2015).

3.3

Traditional Architecture Overview
The traditional test architecture utilizes one ﬁrewall, as shown in Figure 3.1. The

aim of this test was to ﬁnd the endurance and spike results of a hardware ﬁrewall. A
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specialized load testing tool (JMeter) was conﬁgured in a master/slave conﬁguration.
The load testing tool was used to implement a HTTP ﬂooding attack. The attack
was implemented by generating heavy HTTP traﬃc which targets a web server. The
hardware ﬁrewall sits inline between the attacker system and the web server, making
all traﬃc pass through the ﬁrewall. Using the ACL1 shown in Table 3.1, HTTP traﬃc
is allowed access, and hence the ﬁrewall doesn’t block any HTTP traﬃc. This is done
to allow access to the web-server, considering that DDoS attacks are implemented
using legitimate traﬃc.

Fig. 3.1. Traditional Environment Architecture

3.4

Implementation & Configuration Setting
To set up the test-bed used in the traditional architecture, we used the following

technologies and conﬁgurations:

Internet Protocol Version
We used the Internet Protocol version 4 (IPv4) to set up the IP addresses of
all devices in the environment. The reason behind the choice of IPv4 and not the
1

See Appendix A1
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newer IPv6 is because IPv4 is the most widely used Internet Protocol (Gupta, 2010).
That makes IPv4 more relevant to our study than IPv6. Also previous studies have
shown that TCP-Flood, UDP-Flood, and ICMP-Flood types of DDoS attacks are the
only types of attacks that change behavior between IPv4 and IPv6 and not HTTPFlood (X. Yang, Ma, & Shi, 2007). The major diﬀerence between IPv6 and IPv4 are
Optimized DHCP, IPSec, Larger address space, and Optimized mobility feature (Bade
& Vanduhe, n.d.; Baker, Iturralde, Le Faucheur, & Davie, 2001; Nikander, Gurtov, &
Henderson, 2010). We conﬁgured the architecture using a static IP address because
it eliminates the plug and play networking provided by DHCP, thereby ensuring more
security (Sitaraman, Mann, Dos Santos, Lou, & Bhasham, 2002). For a complete list
of all the IP addresses used refer to Appendix A.

Application Protocol
We used Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) to ﬂood the devices; it is the only
legitimate protocol allowed in our Access Control conﬁguration. We used HTTP
because it is the protocol used to communicate between a client and a web-server
(Casilari, Gonzblez, & Sandoval, 2001). A client submits a HTTP request message
to the server, and the server respond with resources such as HTML ﬁles and other
contents (Mah, 1997). Because we are using HTTP, we decided to implement a
HTTP-Flood DDoS attack.

Packet Filters Access Control
For the hardware ﬁrewall in the traditional architecture, we blocked incoming
traﬃc on eth0, the outside Ethernet port. We allowed only ICMP, HTTP, and TCP
Port 80, because ICMP is used to Ping the network (Deering, 1991). HTTP is used
to communicate with the web server (Mah, 1997) and TCP port 80 is the endpoint
used to communicate HTTP used in WWW (Cole, 2011). Table 3.1 shows the access
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Table 3.1
Access Control List of Traditional Packet Filter
Command

List

Allow

Conﬁg# access-list 110 permit TCP any eq 80 host 10.10.10.0/24

Allow

Conﬁg# access-list 110 permit ICMP any any

Allow

Conﬁg# access-list 110 permit HTTP any any

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 520

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny ip any host X.X.X.X

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny ospf any any

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny host X.X.X.X

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 21

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 22

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 25

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 110

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 143

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 135

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 445

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 1434

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4444

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4899

Deny

Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 135

Conﬁg

access-group 110 in interface ’outside’

Apply

’outside’ inbound traﬃc on eth0/0

control list applied to the inbound Ethernet port of the ﬁrewall. A complete list of
denied and allowed access lists can be found in the Appendix.
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Table 3.2
Hardware Server Resource
Resource

Availability

RAM

32GB

CPU

Intel Quad Core 4.66GHz

Storage

2TB

Deployed Hypervisor
A web server is the ﬁnal destination of our HTTP-Flood attack. The web server
runs as a virtual machine in a virtualized environment. And for every virtualized
environment to run virtual machines, there must be a hypervisor that is being used
to create and runs the virtual machine (ESXi, n.d.). In this dissertation we used a
VMWare ESXi hypervisor. The hypervisor run on a dedicated hardware server with
the conﬁguration shown in Table 3.2.

Load Tester - JMeter
A load tester (JMeter) was used to generate the HTTP-Flood attack. We used a
fully-featured web application test suite that can simulate a variety of real-life user
behavior. Using the load tester, we were able to generate approx 3,250 request per
second of HTTP traﬃc. The conﬁguration used in the load tester can be found in
Table 3.3 and 3.4. A full installation guide can be found in (JMeter, n.d.).
The conﬁguration was composed of a sequence of set-up components (No. of
Threads, Ramp-Up, and Loop Count) that determines how the load test will be
simulated. Table 3.4 shows the conﬁguration components and parameters used to
generate the HTTP request packets.
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Table 3.3
JMeter Conﬁguration Components

No. of Threads(users)
Ramp-Up (in secs)

No. of users JMeter will attempt to simulate.

Duration of time JMeter will take to distribute the start of thread

Loop Count

No. of times to execute the test.

HTTP Request Defaults
We added a HTTP Request Defaults. The HTTP Request Defaults conﬁguration
element is used to set default values for HTTP Request in our test plan. This is
useful because we want to send multiple HTTP requests to the server as part of our
test. In the HTTP Request Defaults, under the Web Server section. We added the
IP address of the web server 10.10.10.80. Figure 3.3 shows the HTTP ﬂood request
packets.
Table 3.4
JMeter Conﬁguration/Test Parameters
No. of Threads (users)

32500.

Ramp-Up (in secs)

10.

Loop Count

250

Generated Packet

3,250/sec.

Web Server
We used an Apache HTTP Server, because it is the most popular web server
(Project, n.d.). We installed and conﬁgured the web server inside a Ubuntu Linux
distribution. We conﬁgured the Apache web server by placing directives in plain text
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conﬁguration ﬁles. These directives are separated between the following ﬁles and
directories. The directives are:
1. apache2.conf : the main Apache2 conﬁguration ﬁle. Contains settings that are
global to Apache2.
2. httpd.conf : historically the main Apache2 conﬁguration ﬁle, named after the
HTTPd daemon. The ﬁle no longer exists. In older versions of Ubuntu the ﬁle
might be present but empty, as all conﬁguration options have been moved to
the directories mentioned below.
3. conf-available: this directory contains available conﬁguration ﬁles. All ﬁles
that were previously in /etc/apache2/conf.d should be moved to /etc/apache2/confavailable.
4. conf-enabled: holds symlinks to the ﬁles in /etc/apache2/conf-available. When
a conﬁguration ﬁle is symlinked, it will be enabled the next time apache2 is
restarted.
5. envvars: ﬁle where Apache2 environment variables are set.
6. mods-available: this directory contains conﬁguration ﬁles to load modules
and conﬁgure them. Not all modules have speciﬁc conﬁguration ﬁles, however.
7. mods-enabled: holds symlinks to the ﬁles in /etc/apache2/mods-available.
When a module conﬁguration ﬁle is symlinked, it will be enabled the next time
apache2 is restarted.
8. ports.conf : houses the directives that determine which TCP ports Apache2 is
listening.
9. sites-available: this directory has conﬁguration ﬁles for Apache2 Virtual Hosts.
Virtual Hosts allow Apache2 to be conﬁgured for multiple sites that have separate conﬁgurations.
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10. sites-enabled: similar to mods-enabled, sites-enabled contains symlinks to the
/etc/apache2/sites-available directory. Similarly when a conﬁguration ﬁle in
sites-available is symlinked, the site conﬁgured will be active once Apache2 is
restarted.
11. magic: instructions for determining MIME type based on the ﬁrst few bytes of
a ﬁle.
We installed the Apache web server inside a Ubuntu Linux distribution using this
command:
sudo apt-get install apache2
And we conﬁgured the web server using these commands:
sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 start #start webserver
sudo /update-rc.d apache defaults

#runs webserver from autostart

gksu gedit /etc/apache2/sites-available/site1 #this enable the .htaccess file
sudo /etc/init.d/apache2 restart #this restarts apache

3.5

Implementing the Traditional Test
In order to implement the test, the hardware ﬁrewall was conﬁgured to allow

HTTP traﬃc, and the load testing tool (Jmeter) - an open source application, which
is a 100% pure Java application designed to load test functional behavior - measures
performance and test web applications2 used to generate HTTP traﬃc. The traﬃc
was targeted towards the ﬁrewall, and conﬁgured in a master/slave conﬁguration.
Three computers were serving as Masters and 59 as slave. The “Number of Threads”
(threads are used to simulate concurrent connections to your server application) is set
to 32500. Each thread will execute the test plan in its entirety, completely independently of other test threads. The “Ramp-Up Period” (ramp-up period tells JMeter
2

http://jmeter.apache.org/
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how long to take to “ramp-up” to the full number of threads chosen. If 10 threads are
used, and the ramp-up period is 100 seconds; JMeter will take 100 seconds to get all
10 threads up and running). Figure 3.2 depicts the load tester conﬁguration settings.

Fig. 3.2. JMeter conﬁguration Settings

For the attack to be implemented, the load tester (JMeter) connects to our Apache
web server, and establishes a TCP connection using a three-way handshake:
JMeter sends a SYN packet to Apache web server.
Apache web server sends a SYN ACK packet to JMeter.
JMeter sends an ACK packet to Apache web server.
HTTP Flood involves opening up a valid TCP connection with Apache Web server,
and then sending a request.
Immediately after the TCP connection is opened between JMeter and Apache web
server, allowing free communication between the two, JMeter starts sending HTTP
GET requests to the Apache web server using the default parser.
org.apache.jmeter.protocol.http.parser.LargeBasedHtmlParser.
Part of HTTP-GET Flood request sent by JMeter was captured using Wireshark:

10.10.10.22:56396 -> 10.10.10.80:80 [AP] GET/HTTP/2 Host:10.10.10.79 index.php

10.10.10.22:55300 -> 10.10.10.80:80 [AP] GET/HTTP/2 Host:10.10.10.79 index.php

10.10.10.22:51486 -> 10.10.10.80:80 [AP] GET/HTTP/2 Host:10.10.10.79 index.php

10.10.10.22:40962 -> 10.10.10.80:80 [AP] GET/HTTP/2 Host:10.10.10.79 index.php

10.10.10.22:42728 -> 10.10.10.80:80 [AP] GET/HTTP/2 Host:10.10.10.79 index.php
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The HTTP GET Flood legitimately downloads a picture (pic1.jpg) from the
Apache Web server’s index page. It establishes a full session and actually receives all
the data from the web page. Because our traditional ﬁrewall sits inline between the
load tester (client) and the web server, the ﬁrewall has to process every GET request
that passes through. Approximately 3,250 request were sent per second, ultimately
over ﬂooding the ﬁrewall because it couldn’t process every request sent. Figure 3.3
shows JMeter sending the HTTP request packets.

Fig. 3.3. HTTP GET Flood Request
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3.6

Evaluation & Analysis
As shown in Figure 3.4, the traditional test which uses real HTTP traﬃc generated

from the load tester conﬁgured in Master/Slave on 62 computers. The packet drop
was at 76.5%, the CPU Utilization was at 67%, and the memory utilization at 81%.
This is the level at which the hardware ﬁrewall became non-responsive, the hardware
ﬁrewall was maxed out, which results in its failure with a downtime of about 30
seconds, and about 56 seconds recovery time, as shown in Table 3.5. As the attack
load increases, the CPU usage of the hardware ﬁrewall increases. Table 3.8 shows the
CPU utilization based on the time required. In addition to the CPU utilization, the
memory utilization also reaches a maximum of 81%. The packet drop was high based
on the received and transmitted packets, as shown in Table 3.6.

Fig. 3.4. The Traditional Architecture Results

3.6.1

Downtime & Recovery Period Analysis

Table 3.5 shows the downtime and recovery time of the hardware packet ﬁlter
following its failure. The hardware ﬁrewall was non-responsive for about 30 seconds
before it became responsive. It took about 56 seconds to recover to its working state.
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The recovery period followed the test (HTTP ﬂood attack) suspension. Part of the
longer duration in the recovery period was as a result of the boot sequence.

Fig. 3.5. Recovery & Downtime Periods

Fig. 3.6. CPU Usage over Time

Table 3.5
Time Period Analysis
Action

Time (secs)

Downtime

30

Recovery Time

56

61

Table 3.6
Packet Transmission Analysis
Flow Direction Outside - eth0

Inside - eth1

Received

39357350

11877268

Transmitted

10256915

25143799

Table 3.7
Memory Utilization Analysis - 8GB
Usage in %
Free Memory

19%

Used Memory

81%

Table 3.8
CPU Utilization & Time Required Analysis

3.7

Time (secs)

CPU Usage

300secs

17%

60secs

49%

5secs

67%

Defined Thresholds
Due to the fact that the hardware ﬁrewall fails under heavy traﬃc as presented, we

decided to deﬁne new set of thresholds, diﬀerent than those set by the ﬁrewall vendor.
When these thresholds are reached, the device is rendered incapable of performing as
required; hence, an action must be taken to avoid failure. The newly deﬁned threshold
based on the results collected are presented in Table 3.9.
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Table 3.9
Traditional Packet Filter: Newly Deﬁned Threshold
Packet Drop

≥ 10%

Memory Utilization ≥ 80%
CPU Utilization

3.8

≥ 65%

Chapter Summary
This chapter highlights our test-bed implementation, and hardware ﬁrewall out-

comes. From the result, we deﬁned new thresholds to be used in subsequent chapter.
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4. VIRTUALIZED ARCHITECTURE PERFORMANCE
TEST
4.1

Introduction
Cloud computing represents one of the most signiﬁcant shifts in information tech-

nology we are likely to see in our lifetimes. Customers are both excited and nervous
about the prospects of Cloud Computing. They are excited by the opportunities to
reduce capital costs, divest infrastructure management, and focus on core competencies. Most of all, they are excited by the agility oﬀered by the on-demand provisioning
of computing and the ability to align information technology with business strategies
and needs more readily. However, customers are also very concerned about the risks
of Cloud Computing if it is not properly secured. And the loss of direct control over
systems for which they are nonetheless accountable.
Security controls in cloud computing are, for the most part, no diﬀerent than security controls in any IT environment. However, because of the cloud service models,
operational models, and the technologies used to enable cloud services, cloud computing may present diﬀerent risks than traditional IT solutions to an organization.
Some of the security threats to cloud computing outlined by Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) are: Abuse and nefarious use of Cloud computing, Insecure API’s,
Malicious Insider, Shared Technology Vulnerabilities, Data Loss/Leakage, Account,
Service & Traﬃc Hijacking, Unknown risk proﬁle & Hypercall Threats (Alliance,
2011). NIST deﬁned Cloud Computing as:
“A model for enabling ubiquitous, convenient, on-demand network access to a shared
pool of conﬁgurable computing resources (e.g. networks, servers, storage,
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal
management eﬀort or service provider interaction” (Mell & Grance, 2011).
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In a nutshell, cloud computing is a way of separating an application from the
operating system and hardware. The Cloud Security Alliance (CSA) deﬁned cloud
computing as:
“an evolving term that describes the development of many existing technologies and
approaches to computing into something diﬀerent. Cloud separates application and
information resources from the underlying infrastructure, and mechanisms used to
deliver them” (Alliance, 2011).

4.1.1

Virtualized Environments

Cloud Computing services are usually backed by large-scale data centers composed
of thousands of computers. Such data centers are built to serve many users and
host many disparate applications. For this purpose, hardware virtualization can be
considered as a perfect ﬁt to overcome most operational issues of data center building
maintenance (Buyya et al., 2010). Virtualization allows running multiple operating
systems and software stacks on a single physical platform. Figure 4.1 shows a software
layer, the hypervisor also known as a virtual machine monitor (VMM), which mediates
access to the physical hardware, presenting each guest operating system (VM) a set
of virtual platform interfaces.
Virtualization has been a key enabling technology for the evolution of cloud computing in its current form (Irvine, Robin, et al., 2000; Popek & Goldberg, 1974). In
particular, a hardware virtualization has enabled IaaS providers to eﬃciently use the
available hardware resources in order to provide computing and storage services to
their clients.

Type I VMM
Type I VMM, also known as a bare-metal, runs on a bare machine. It is an
operating system with virtualization mechanisms. A type I VMM runs directly on
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Fig. 4.1. Traditional vs. Virtualized Environments.

the machine hardware. It is an operating system or kernel that has mechanisms
to support virtual machines. It performs scheduling and resources allocation for all
virtual machines in the system and requires drivers for hardware peripherals.

4.1.2

Network Functions Virtualization

Network function virtualization is an initiative to virtualize network services being carried out by proprietary, dedicated hardware. NFV decreases the proprietary
hardware needed to launch and operate network services 1 . NFV allows network operators to instantiate middleboxes in virtual machines and place those VMs at arbitrary
locations in the network (ESTI, n.d.). Current approaches to NFV still treat middleboxes as monolithic entities, and do not explore how the constituent components of
a middlebox might be decomposed into smaller modules (Anwer et al., 2015).
Because of the various partners with clashing objectives and strategies, changes to
the current network designs are presently constrained to basic incremental additions;
deployment of any new radically diﬀerent technology is next to impossible. To battle oﬀ this solidiﬁcation, network virtualization has been portrayed as a diversifying
1

TechTarget - NFV defined
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attribute to the future inner-networking paradigm. By introducing a plurality of heterogenous network architectures cohabiting on a shared physical substrate, network
virtualization promotes innovations and diversiﬁed applications. A paper surveyed
the existing technologies and wide-array of past and state-of-the-art projects on network virtualization followed by a discussion of major changes in the area (Chowdhury
& Boutaba, 2010).
Network function virtualization (NFV) has drawn signiﬁcant attention from both
industry and academia as an important shift in telecommunication service provisioning. By decoupling network functions (NFs) from the physical devices on which they
run, NFV has the potential to lead to signiﬁcant reductions in operating expenses
(OPEX) and capital expenses (CAPEX) that facilitate the deployment of new services with increased agility and faster time-to-value. The NFV paradigm is still in
its infancy and there is a large spectrum of opportunities for the research community
to develop new architectures, systems, and applications, to evaluate alternatives and
trade-oﬀs in developing technologies for its successful deployment. After discussing
NFV and its relationship with complementary ﬁelds of software-deﬁned networking
(SDN) and cloud computing. A study surveyed the state-of-the-art NFV, and identify promising research directions in the area. The study also presents an overview
of key NFV projects, standardization eﬀorts, early implementations, use cases, and
commercial products (Mijumbi et al., 2015).
Middlebox hardware appliances are known to come with a number of problems,
such as being costly, diﬃcult to manage, and inﬂexible in their functionality. NFV
has alleviated all such problems and due to NFV’s ﬂexibility, several platforms are
in place. A group of researchers introduced ClickOS a high performance, virtualized software middlebox platform. ClickOS virtual machines are small (5MB), boot
quickly (20 milliseconds), add little delay (45 microseconds), and over one hundred
hosts can concurrently run while saturating a 10Gb pipe on a commodity server. The
study implements a wide range of middleboxes, including a ﬁrewall, a carrier-grade
NAT, and a load balancer to show that ClickOS can handle packets in the millions per

67
second (Martins et al., 2014). Others presented EmPOWER, an experiment test-bed
which aims at oﬀering an open platform on top of which novel concepts can be tested
at scale (Riggio, Rasheed, & Granelli, 2013).
Another article presents the analysis, design, and ﬁrst implementation of the routing function in a virtualized manner. Considering the current co-existence of IPv4 and
IPv6 and the possibilities brought into the arena by OpenFlow-enabled infrastructures, the article describes the design of the virtualized routing protocol, its enabled
simple management and signaling messages overhead avoidance in the control plane
level, and the diﬀerent scenarios considered to validate the virtualized function. In
essence, the study describes the ﬁrst implementation of the functional NFV concept
through the virtualization of the routing function over an OpenFlow network. The
diﬀerent scenarios validated in the article are used to demonstrate the applicability
of the NFV-powered implementation proposed into actual production environments
(Batalle, Ferrer Riera, Escalona, & Garcia-Espin, 2013). Another study presents
a measurement to characterize the impact of virtualization on the networking performance of the Amazon Elastic Cloud Computing (EC2) data center. The study
measures the processor sharing, packet delay, TCP/UDP throughput, and packet
loss among Amazon EC2 virtual machines. The results show that although the data
center network is lightly utilized, virtualization can still cause signiﬁcant throughput
instability and abnormal delay variations. The study concludes with the implications
of its ﬁndings on several classes of applications (G. Wang & Ng, 2010).

4.2

Problem Statement
The study proves that virtualization can result in overhead due to decreased per-

formance (Sahoo, Mohapatra, & Lath, 2010). This happens because performance is
often being compromised due to ﬂexibility. Virtual machines have the capability of
sharing resources through resource management (Beloglazov & Buyya, 2010). This
works when one virtual machine borrows resources from another idle virtual machine.
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This resource sharing capability of virtual machines comes with security issues when
a running virtual machine borrows all of the available resources, making idle virtual
machines completely disengage without the capability of running. Other associated
problems identiﬁed with resource sharing are hypercall and hyperthreats. The running virtual machine keeps on requesting resources until there is none available. Hence
all other functions are rendered ineﬀective (Shropshire, 2015). However, with these
known issues, multiple studies prove that when network functions are virtualized,
they perform better than traditional hardware devices (Guillen et al., 2012; Qiu et
al., 2001; Sheth & Thakker, 2011; Waziri Jr et al., 2014; Waziri Jr & Shropshire,
2015).
Single point of failure (SPOF) is always an issue. Even though virtual machines
are decoupled from the hardware, VM’s are still dependent on the hardware running
the hypervisor (server). Failure in the hardware automatically results in a failure of
all virtual machines (Menascé, 2005; Pfaﬀ et al., 2009; Sahoo et al., 2010).
In this dissertation, we tested both hardware and virtual ﬁrewalls; we also found
that virtual packet ﬁlters to be more reliable under stress. However, because a hardware ﬁrewall is used to protect the underlying hardware (server) used by the hypervisor, whatever aﬀects the traditional ﬁrewall aﬀects the virtualized environment. To
ﬁnd the threshold of the virtual ﬁrewall, we implemented the same test carried out
on the traditional ﬁrewall, using a diﬀerent load testing tool.

4.3

Virtual Architecture Overview
Similar to the traditional architecture, the aim of the virtual test was to ﬁnd the

weakness and limitations of the virtual ﬁrewall. The virtual ﬁrewall was installed
as a VM in a virtualized environment and connected inline prior to the web server.
However, in the case of the virtual test, a diﬀerent load testing tool2 was used to
generate the HTTP ﬂood packets. The reason for using a diﬀerent testing tool was
2

High Orbit Ion Cannon
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the limitation of resources imposed by the virtual environment. Figure 4.2 depicts
the virtual architecture. The ACL3 used in the virtual ﬁrewall is similar to that of
the hardware ﬁrewall allowing HTTP traﬃc, ICMP, and TCP Port 80, while blocking
all other incoming connections.

Fig. 4.2. Virtual Environment Architecture

4.4

Implementation & Configuration Settings

Load Tester - HOIC
We used HOIC as the HTTP Flood load tester. HOIC is an open source network
stress testing and denial of service attack application written in BASIC. It is designed
to attack as many as 256 URLs simultaneously Unlike the normal master/zombie
architecture of DDoS attacks, HOIC works based on bandwidth availability. Using
HOIC, we were able to generate HTTP traﬃc of approximately 1Gbps per thread.
These were generated from 249 Cannons and 2 Threads. Table 4.1 shows our HOIC
conﬁguration settings and the resulting output per thread generated.
3

See Appendix A2
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Table 4.1
Conﬁguring HOIC for Virtual Load Testing
Target URL/IP

10.10.10.79

Power

HIGH.

Booster

GenericBoost.hoic

Threads

2

Cannons per Thread

249

Output per Thread

>1GB

1. URL - The address of the Apache Web server
2. Power - This sets the velocity. We set the power to ’HIGH’, making it 8
request/sec for each thread.
3. Booster - The script used to generate the HTTP Flood. We used the ’GenericBoost.hoic’ script.
4. Threads - The number of users HOIC will attempt to simulate.

Building a Test Plan - HOIC
The test plan is composed of a sequence of the components presented above. The
components determines how the traﬃc will be generated. We conﬁgured these details.
Table 4.1 presents the conﬁguration values for the virtual ﬁrewall load testing.
Similar to the Traditional Test, the HTTP GET Flood we initiated is legitimately
downloading a picture (pic1.jpg) from the Apache Web server, meaning it establishes
a full TCP session and actually receives all the data from the web page because
the virtual ﬁrewall sits inline between the load tester (client) and the web server.
The ﬁrewall must process every GET request that passes through. More than 1GB
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of traﬃc were generated per threat per session. We ﬁnally over-ﬂooded the virtual
ﬁrewall because it couldn’t process each an every request that was sent.
From the settings conﬁgured, the HTTP packets that targeted the Apache web
server were captured as:
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 200 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 201 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 202 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 203 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 204 21124
- - 72.192.214.223 - "GET / HTTP/2" "10.10.10.79" 205 21124

4.4.1

HTTP GET Flood Request

HOIC request are not static; they randomly request from diﬀerent sources, based
on bandwidth. The HTTP Flood request is presented below:
GET / HTTP/2
Accept: */*
Accept-Language: en
Referer: GenericBoost.hoic
User-Agent: HOIC/4.0 (CLR 1.1.4322)
If-Modified-Since: Fri, 10 Jun 2016 11:59:59 GMT
Host: 10.10.10.79
The request speciﬁes “HTTP/2,” which is the successor of HTTP/1.1 that was
standardized in 2015. HTTP/2 enables a more eﬃcient use of network resources and
a reduced perception of latency by introducing header ﬁeld compression and allowing
multiple concurrent exchanges on the same connection (Belshe, Thomson, & Peon,
2015). The host header can be analyzed using packet analysis tools, such as wireshark,
which is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, we can see the host address
as “10.10.10.79.”
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Virtual Packet Filter Access Control
Similar to the traditional ﬁrewall, we blocked all incoming traﬃc on eth0 (the
outside ethernet port) of the virtual ﬁrewall. We allowed ICMP, HTTP, and the
TCP Port 80. This allows for end to end communication and pinging between the
client and web-server, Below are the Access Control List applied to eth0:
• Rule 1:
Vyatta# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 action reject
Vyatta# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 source address X.X.X.X
Vyatta# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 protocol TCP
• Rule 2:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 source address X.X.X.X
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 protocol TCP
• Rule 3:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 protocol UDP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 destination port 520
• Rule 4:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 source address X.X.X.X
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 protocol IP
• Rule 5:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 protocol OSPF
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• Rule 6:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 source address X.X.X.X
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 protocol TCP
• Rule 7:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 destination port 80
• Rule 8:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 destination port 21
• Rule 9:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 destination port 22
• Rule 10:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 destination port 25
• Rule 11:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 destination port 110

74
• Rule 12:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 destination port 143
• Rule 13:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 protocol UDP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 destination port 135
• Rule 14:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 destination port 445
• Rule 15:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 destination port 1434
• Rule 16:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 destination port 4444
• Rule 17:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 destination port 4899
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• Rule 18:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 protocol ICMP
• Rule 19:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 source address 10.10.10.0/24
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 protocol TCP
• Rule 20:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 protocol HTTP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 destination address 10.10.10.79
• Apply to interface and commit:
Conﬁg# set interfaces ethernet eth1 ﬁrewall in name FWRULES-1
Conﬁg# commit
• To show ﬁrewall rules:
Conﬁg# show ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1
• To show interface rules:
Conﬁg# show interfaces ethernet eth1 ﬁrewall
By default, the virtual ﬁrewall rules are not stateful. The ﬁrewall has a default
drop rule that is active when a default action is not speciﬁed. To enable our stateful
rules and ensure that incoming traﬃc on eth0 for our test session is allowed. We
established these new commands:
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firewall {
name clienttoserver {
default-action drop
rule 5 {
action accept
destination {
port 80
}
protocol tcp
state {
established enable
new enable
related enable
}
}
}
name servertoclient {
default-action drop
rule 5 {
action accept
state {
established enable
related enable
}
}

77
4.5

Evaluation & Analysis
The virtual ﬁrewall was still working at an optimum performance with 99% mem-

ory utilization. The virtual ﬁrewall was responsive because of the resource sharing
management capabilities of virtualized environments. We then continue to ﬂood the
virtual ﬁrewall with unlimited traﬃc generated from HOIC until the CPU Utilization
reached 71%, at which point the virtual ﬁrewall eventually became non-responsive.
Table 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show the virtual ﬁrewall resource usage during the attack
before it failed.
Table 4.2
Virtual Resources Usage - 8GB
Memory

CPU - Hypervisor Monitored

Packet Transferred

Total

8GB

4.66GHz

>250GB of Packets

Used (%)

99.17%

71%

-

Free (%)

0.83%

29%

-

Fig. 4.3. Virtual Architecture Results
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Table 4.3
Time Period Analysis for Virtual Packet Filter
Action

Time (secs)

Downtime

12

Recovery Time

28

From these results and previous studies, we see that the virtual ﬁrewall does a
better job at responding to DDoS attacks than the traditional ﬁrewall, thereby making
it a better choice when it comes to mitigating DDoS and transferring the hardware
ﬁltering services.

Fig. 4.4. Virtual Downtime & Recovery Time Analysis

4.5.1

Downtime & Recovery Period Analysis

Table 4.3 shows the downtime and recovery time of the virtual ﬁrewall after it
failed. The virtual ﬁrewall was non-responsive for about 12 seconds before it became
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responsive. It took about 28 seconds to recover back to its working state. The
recovery period was after the test was suspended. The recovery time for the virtual
ﬁrewall was better than that of the hardware ﬁrewall because the hypervisor was
responding; hence the virtual ﬁrewall doesn’t have to deal with hardware boot-up.

4.6

Chapter Summary
This chapter starts by explaining Network Function Virtualization and introduces

the problems faced by virtualized architectures. We then highlight our virtual architecture set-up, its implementation and conﬁguration, and conclude by explaining the
outcome of stressing the virtual ﬁrewall.
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5. PERFORMANCE MONITOR
5.1

Background
Our performance monitor is not the ﬁrst performance monitor, or even the ﬁrst

ﬁrewall performance monitor. But to the best of our knowledge it is the ﬁrst to provide a means of mitigating DDoS attacks by monitoring ﬁrewall performance. The
paper visual ﬁrewall (C. P. Lee, Tros, Gibbs, Beyah, & Copeland, 2005) seeks to aid
the conﬁguration of ﬁrewalls and monitoring of networks by providing four simultaneous views that display varying levels of detail and time scales as well as correctly
visualizing ﬁrewall reactions to individual packets. The four implemented views are:
Real-Time Traﬃc, Visual Signature, Statistics, and IDS Alarm. These views provide
the levels of detail that system administrators need to properly monitor their systems in passive or active manners. The paper visualized several attacks, and made
sure that individuals unfamiliar with networking concepts can quickly distinguish
between benign and malignant traﬃc patterns with minimal instruction. Another
monitoring paper (Yuan & Mills, 2005) proposes a method for early detection. Using
a few observation points, the proposed method can monitor the macroscopic eﬀect
of DDoS ﬂooding attacks and then inform more detailed detection systems when a
DDoS attack possibly arises in transit or source networks.
Others focused on packet monitoring in Cloud Environment to prevent DDoS
attacks (Chouhan & Peddoju, 2013) using Hop Count Filtering. The approach of
Hop Count Filtering provides a network independent and readily available solution
to prevent DDoS attacks in Cloud environments. The method decreases the unavailability of cloud services to legitimate clients, reduce number of updates, and saves
computation time. The approach is simulated in a CloudSim toolkit environment and
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corresponding results are produced. Others monitored ﬁrewall traﬃc using Intrusion
Detection Systems (Asarcıklı, 2005).
However, none of these papers provided a mitigation solution to DDoS attacks
targeting ﬁrewalls in traditional and virtual environments. Hence, the birth of our
performance monitor as the ﬁrst ﬁrewall monitor DDoS mitigation solution.

5.2

Performance Monitor Design
The performance monitor is mirrored to the hardware and virtual ﬁrewall. The

monitor runs on a dedicated system as a virtual machine. Based on the results
of both the traditional and virtual test, instructions were given. The monitor was
coded in python and the threshold at which the ﬁrewalls can migrate packet ﬁltering
services was deﬁned in the code. No GUI was used. The monitor connects with the
ﬁrewalls through their respective API’s. The communication between the monitor
and the ﬁrewalls is encrypted using AES. MySQL database was connected to store
the heuristics based on the deﬁned thresholds. Figure 5.1 shows how the monitor
connects to the ﬁrewall.
When either the traditional or virtual ﬁrewall becomes overwhelmed during the
test, the monitor reroutes the traﬃc meant for the failed ﬁrewall to the other ﬁrewall,
thereby allowing the overwhelmed ﬁrewall to resume to its working state, hence,
downtime as a result of DDoS attack is minimized.

5.3

Implementation & Deployment

5.3.1

API Implementation

Implementing the API connections for both ﬁrewalls is based on the guide provided
by the ﬁrewall vendors1 . The typical request ﬂow for the REST PUT/POST/DELETE
API request are:
1

http://www.cisco.com & http://www.brocade.com/
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Fig. 5.1. Performance Monitor Architecture

• REST Client establishes SSL connection to the ﬁrewall
• REST Client sends API request with basic authentication header to ASA.
• Firewall server validates and processes clients request.
• Firewall HTTP server opens the connection to REST Agent using a TCP channel, and writes the HTTP request to the REST Agent.
• Firewall HTTP server waits for REST Agent processs response.
• REST Agent processes API request, picks the session/user info, and invokes
CLI command requests to Admin handler listening on localhost port in Firewall.
REST Agent includes the session/user info in the request.
• Admin handler processes the CLI commands and collects the result output.
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• Admin handler sends the response for the CLI commands request to REST
Agent.
• REST Agent prepares the response for REST API request and sends to the
Firewall HTTP server.
• Firewall HTTP server forwards the response to the client. Server doesn’t process
the response received from the REST Agent process.
Basic Authorization header must be added to every REST API request and authentication will be performed for every request. It is recommended to use Certiﬁcate
Authority (CA) issued certiﬁcates on the ﬁrewalls, so that REST API clients can validate the server certiﬁcates of the ﬁrewalls during the SSL connection establishment.
The process of how the monitors API communicates with our ﬁrewalls is presented
in Figure 5.2
The communication between the ﬁrewalls and the performance monitor is established using the ﬁrewall respective RESTAPI. REST stands for Representation State
Transfer. It is a term coined by Roy Fielding in his dissertation (Fielding, 2000) to
refer to a software architectural style. The REST architectural style describes six
constraints: Uniform Interface, Stateless, Cache-able, Client-Server, Layered System,
and Code on Demand. This constraint states that a REST API should be driven by
nothing but hypermedia. This is how a web browser interacts with well-behaved web
applications, where the browser transitions to diﬀerent pages based on the selected
hyperlinks and actions present in the pages. Since HTTP has been used to transfer
information that is not hypertext, this constraint is often ignored by REST API designs. Instead of deﬁning API in terms of hypermedia, some so-called REST APIs
are modeled as a set of interfaces implemented by resources. Although this design
supports the REST uniform interface constraint, it inevitably creates ﬁxed resource
names, types and hierarchies that violate the REST API design rules prescribed by
Roy Fielding (Fielding, 2000). This kind of violations leads to an API that depends
on the out-of-band information, instead of hypermedia, to drive the interactions be-
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Fig. 5.2. API Call Process

tween components (Li & Chou, 2011). To properly understand how RESTAPIs work
is beyond the scope of this dissertation.

5.3.2

MySQL Database Implementation

To store the thresholds and heuristic conditions used to migrate packet ﬁltering
services between the ﬁrewalls, we used a MySQL database. To do that, we installed
the MySQL driver, because python doesn’t come with MySQL; by default, it comes
with SQLite. We installed the MySQL package. The implementation and use of
MySQL is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, the commands we used to
install MySQL database in Ubuntu debian distros is:
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sudo apt-get install python-mysqldb
After installation, we then used MySQL inside python like any other package.
This is how we imported and connected MySQL to python:
#!/usr/bin/python
import MySQLdb
db =

MySQLdb.connect(host="localhost",

user="dissertation",
passwd="dissertation_password",
db="dissertation_db")

5.3.3

AES Implementation using PyCrypto

In other to secure the RESTAPI connection between the ﬁrewalls and the performance monitor, an AES implementation of python using PyCrypto2 was used
(Buchmann, 2013; Ferguson, Schneier, & Kohno, n.d.; Katz & Lindell, 2014; Lindell,
2005; Schneier, 1997). This implementation is based on the guide provided in “A
Working Introduction to Crypto using PyCrypto” (Isom, 2011).

5.4

Performance Analysis
The performance monitor was analyzed by integrating it into the ﬁrewalls, by con-

ducting the same test, and ﬂooding the ﬁrewalls with HTTP traﬃc. The performance
monitor proved to be eﬀective after we surpassed the generated HTTP traﬃc that
ﬂooded the hardware ﬁrewall, and the ﬁrewall was still responsive. However, considering that the virtual ﬁrewall has a better performance than the hardware ﬁrewall,
the operation was smooth. The packet ﬁltering process of the hardware ﬁrewall was
transferred to the virtual ﬁrewall. The process by which the performance monitor
makes decision is presented in Figure 5.3.
2

https://www.dlitz.net/software/pycrypto/api/2.6/
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Fig. 5.3. Performance Monitor/Migration Decision Flow
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5.4.1

Filtering Service Transfer

The monitor starts by checking the ﬁrewall states to see if there is an anomaly, then
it proceeds to make decisions; if the ﬁrewall is overwhelmed, it checks its parameters
and invokes the instructions that were deﬁned, then transfers the ﬁltering services.
If the ﬁrewall is not overwhelmed; it applies the ﬁrewall’s access list and continues
operation by proceeding to its designated destination.

5.4.2

Performance Comparison

Table 5.1 shows the performance results of the devices before and after using the
monitor. The memory utilization of the hardware ﬁrewall considerably reduced from
81% to 34% without the monitor. The CPU utilization reduced from 67% to 28%.
Table 5.1
Comparative Analysis of Performance Results

Architecture

Mem Utilization

CPU Utilization Packet Drop

Traditional

81%

67%

76.5%

Virtual

99.17%

71%

-

Traditional with PM*

34%

28%

-

Virtual with PM*

98.2%

73.6%

-

However, for the virtual ﬁrewall, the change was a minimal decrease. The performance of both Memory & CPU of the virtual device with the monitor connected
decreased from 98.2% to 73.6% respectively, compared to 99.17% and 71% without
the monitor. The performance decrease is as a result of the monitor being added
to the topology. This shows a success; most importantly, downtime was avoided,
considering none of the devices failed.
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Fig. 5.4. Comparative Performance Analysis

5.4.3

Thresholds & Heuristic Rules/SLA

Based on the analysis and thresholds identiﬁed from both ﬁrewalls, we deﬁned
these heuristics and embedded them as part of the monitor’s instructions. These
are the actions the performance monitor does whenever one of the set thresholds is
reached. These rules can always be deﬁned based on SLA if such topology were to
be adopted.
• For Hardware Instructions:
- If Packet Drops is high, then migrate packet ﬁltering service to virtual
ﬁrewall, otherwise continue on hardware ﬁrewall.
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- If none of the deﬁned heuristics is met, then continue packet ﬁltering
services on hardware ﬁrewall.

5.5

Chapter Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a ﬁrewall performance monitor. The monitor con-

nects to two ﬁrewalls and injects instructions when certain conditions are met. We
discuss the design, implementation, deployment, and performance analysis. The performance monitor is not a speciﬁc method of DDoS mitigation, but a means for
organizations to test their devices, by stressing them and ﬁnding the device threshold, then using those thresholds to create a heuristic that can be used to conﬁgure the
monitor. We explain how the communication between the monitor and the devices
is encrypted using AES by utilizing the PyCrypto implementation of python. We
showed how the monitor stores data using the SQL database.
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6. CONCLUSION
6.1

Connecting the Dots: Justifying the Problem Statement
This dissertation focused on carrying out diﬀerent types of tests to obtain the

results of the research objectives stated earlier. We implemented a monitor in a
secured architecture with two ﬁrewalls from diﬀerent platforms, one using a virtualbased and the other a hardware-based. The monitor monitors the state of the ﬁrewalls
and invoke certain instructions based on the ﬁrewalls state. Both the ﬁrewalls and
monitor are designed to work together in order to provide an optimized packet ﬁlter
architecture and minimize downtime when the ﬁrewalls become overwhelmed due to
a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. To achieve this, two diﬀerent tests
(spike and endurance) at three stages were conducted. A web-server was built to
serve as the target of the HTTP traﬃc.
First we implement and test the traditional environment which consists of the
hardware ﬁrewall. We attacked the ﬁrewall using a HTTP ﬂood DDoS attack to
ﬁnd the hardware ﬁrewall weakness and deﬁne its threshold. Second, we carried out
the same test in the virtual environment, which consists of the virtual ﬁrewall. The
second test was also aimed at ﬁnding the virtual ﬁrewalls weaknesses and limitations.
That was achieved by ﬂooding the ﬁrewall with a HTTP ﬂood DDoS attack. The
ﬁrewall’s threshold was determined at the end. The last phase was implementing the
monitor that monitors the states of both ﬁrewalls.
The monitor was designed to switch packet ﬁltering between the ﬁrewalls when
one of the ﬁrewalls reaches its threshold. Switching the packet ﬁltering ensures that
downtime is avoided within the network, allowing the ﬁrewall to return back to its
stable state before the ﬁltering processes resumes. The monitor monitors the ﬁrewall’s
state based on the heuristic rules fed to it. Those heuristic rules and threshold can
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be deﬁned based on SLA. Each organization uses diﬀerent vendors when it comes to
network devices; hence, a standard threshold cannot be deﬁned. Each device must
go through the same process, then deﬁne the threshold.
The threshold of each device was determined based on CPU Utilization and Memory Utilization.

6.2

Summary
In this dissertation, we looked into how DDoS attacks result in network down-

time, costing organizations billions of dollars. Ease of authorized availability and
access to information is one of the core foundation of computer security. According
to census.gov1 , 97% of our day-to-day data, such as health information, education
information, etc. are all stored digitally, thereby making authorized access to such
data of paramount importance. DDoS attacks cause network downtime, making it
hard for authorized users to access to important data. We highlighted the main issues
with DDoS attacks in earlier chapters.
In addition, we test diﬀerent network architectures and present a framework which
could be used to mitigate DDoS attacks and provide more up-time for computer
networks in chapters 3 and 4.
In chapter 5, we presented a framework that is used to mitigate DDoS and provide
more up-time in a network. We designed a tool (Firewall Performance Monitor) which
listens to the performance of the network devices and then executes instructions when
certain conditions are met.
We concluded the dissertation by explaining the design and implementation of the
ﬁrewall performance monitor.
1

Census Internet Statistics
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6.3

Recommendations & Future Work
The framework we presented provides one of the ﬁrst non-commercial approaches

to mitigating ﬂooding attacks on ﬁrewalls and ensuring more network up-time. The
use of the monitor has shown promising results in enhancing network security systems.
Learning from this study, security administrators can optimize the performance
of ﬁrewalls in a network by ﬁrst evaluating CPU utilization, Memory Utilization,
Packet Drops, and other available resources. Furthermore, security administrators
can implement the same methods we presented to ensure maximum network availability. Keeping in mind that the heuristics the monitor utilizes to make decisions is
dependent on the thresholds deﬁned by the network devices, security administrators
can decide on each device threshold to meet its demands. The monitor’s heuristics
can only be deﬁned based on service level agreements.
An interesting area of future research could focus on the monitor itself; considering
it runs as a continuous script with inﬁnite max loop. It would be interesting to see it
developed as a software running with a simpliﬁed GUI, thereby making the heuristics
deﬁnition more simpliﬁed. Having the monitor run in a closedbox would be another
focus for future research; that would enhance control and limit access to the monitor’s
source-code, thereby ensuring greater security.
Another interesting area of future research is a broader application of same technique presented in this study; The monitor should be deployed other network devices
susceptible to DDoS attacks, and not just to network ﬁrewalls. It would be interesting
to apply the same method to a larger network, to deploy on a large-scale, real world
setting and analyze the results. With this approach, our monitor has the potential of
being the cutting-edge in ﬁnding an innovative solution to DDoS attacks.
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A. FIREWALL ACL CONFIGURATIONS
Both ﬁrewalls are conﬁgured in transparent mode. Depending on the type of device
used, a guide on how to conﬁgure the ﬁrewall can be obtained from the vendor. Below
are the rules we used to conﬁgure the ﬁrewalls. We blocked all incoming traﬃc, and
only allowed authorized traﬃc to pass through (X represents public IP addresses, and
XX represents authorized IP addresses.).

A.1

Hardware Firewall

• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any host X.X.X.X
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any host X.X.X.X
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 520
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny ip any host X.X.X.X
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny ospf any any
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny host X.X.X.X
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 21
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 22
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 25
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 110
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 143
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny udp any any eq 135
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 445
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 1434
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• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4444
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 deny tcp any any eq 4899
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 permit icmp any any
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 permit tcp any host XX.XX.XX.XX
• Conﬁg# access-list 110 permit tcp any host XX.XX.XX.XX
• Apply to inbound traﬃc on ethernet0/0 (outside interface)
• Conﬁg# access-group 110 in interface outside

A.2

Virtual Firewall

• Rule 1:
Vyatta# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 action reject
Vyatta# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 source address X.X.X.X
Vyatta# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 1 protocol TCP
• Rule 2:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 source address X.X.X.X
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 2 protocol TCP
• Rule 3:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 protocol UDP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 3 destination port 520
• Rule 4:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 source address X.X.X.X
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 4 protocol IP
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• Rule 5:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 5 protocol OSPF
• Rule 6:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 source address X.X.X.X
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 6 protocol TCP
• Rule 7:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 7 destination port 80
• Rule 8:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 8 destination port 21
• Rule 9:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 9 destination port 22
• Rule 10:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 10 destination port 25
• Rule 11:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 11 destination port 110
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• Rule 12:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 12 destination port 143
• Rule 13:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 protocol UDP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 13 destination port 135
• Rule 14:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 14 destination port 445
• Rule 15:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 15 destination port 1434
• Rule 16:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 16 destination port 4444
• Rule 17:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 action reject
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 17 destination port 4899
• Rule 18:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 18 protocol ICMP
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• Rule 19:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 source address XX.XX.XX.XX
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 19 protocol TCP
• Rule 20:
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 action accept
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 protocol TCP
Conﬁg# set ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1 rule 20 destination address XX.XX.XX.XX
• Apply to interface and commit:
Conﬁg# set interfaces ethernet eth1 ﬁrewall in name FWRULES-1
Conﬁg# commit
• To show ﬁrewall rules:
Conﬁg# show ﬁrewall name FWRULES-1
• To show rules on interface:
Conﬁg# show interfaces ethernet eth1 ﬁrewall

A.3

Complete Architecture
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Fig. A.1. Complete Architecture I
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Fig. A.2. Complete Architecture II
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